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ABSTRACT
With falling home prices and foreclosures acknowledged as a severe
problem in the U.S., more attention should be paid to the con-
tributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquid-
ation, leaving a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties.
This Article presents a study of 222 residential developers that filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2007-8. A key finding is that very few
developers, as compared to previous studies, confirmed a reorgan-
ization plan. Most were dismissed or converted to Chapter 7, culmi-
nating in foreclosure or liquidation.
An investigation of this liquidation preference reveals that, during a
severe recession, banks may prefer liquidation owing to a capital
shortfall and procyclical regulatory pressure to reduce portfolio
concentrations in real estate lending. This is inconsistent with
existing theories that secured lenders choose economically optimal
outcomes within a bankruptcy case itself. Supporting this hypothesis
is the fact that about half of the secured lenders in this data sample
are themselves failed or undercapitalized banks. Furthermore,
multivariate regression analyses show that a bank's financial distress
has a statistically significant impact on whether it would file a lift-
stay motion to pursue foreclosure. Overall, this constitutes strong
evidence that the standard theory of creditor behavior in bankruptcy
is incomplete without consideration of the regulatory environment
and procyclicality in capital requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the middle of a "perfect foreclosure storm."
According to the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, an
estimated $736,160,105,369 of housing wealth was lost from record
numbers of foreclosures and falling home prices in 2007, and an
estimated $1,144,177,880,280 in 2008.' Between 2005 and 2008, the
decline in housing's contribution to annual Gross Domestic Product was
more than $300 billion.2
Amidst the constant bombardment of news and studies lamenting
the problem of home owners defaulting on their mortgages and being
foreclosed upon, more attention needs to be paid to the problem of
residential developers declaring bankruptcy. In normal times, the liqui-
dation of a bankrupt residential developer might represent an efficient
redeployment of assets, as property prices remain buoyant and other
developers are standing by with the financing and resources to continue
the development. This is no longer true in the current crisis, however,
which has been marked by pervasive market failure. As financially
distressed residential developers and builders go into liquidation or
foreclosure, communities are now being abandoned half-built, to the
great detriment of those already moved in, warranties are lapsing, and
developments are left with potholed roads, open sewers, and other
hazards.'
Half-completed or fire-sale properties can also have a negative
effect on the property values of wider communities and exacerbate
serious problems in housing markets. The following excerpt from the
March 2009 Oversight Report by the Congressional Oversight Panel
shows how foreclosures on developers and homeowners alike can have
1. U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., COAST TO COAST, HOME PRICES ARE DOWN
AND FAMILIES HAVE LOST WEALTH FROM 2007-2009 (2008), http://jec.senate.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid= 1 b2660a6-c009-471 f-ac56-
7e537380f68f.
2. NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, HOUSING'S CONTRIBUTION TO GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, http://www.nahb.com/generic.aspx?sectionlD=784&generic
ContentlD=66226 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
3. See, e.g., Lisa Osburn, Unfinished Subdivisions Are Victims of Faltering
Economy: Lots Crumble and Mud Flows, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 15, 2009, at IA;
Lorraine Mirabella & Melissa Harris, Unfinished Homes and Stolen Dreams: A
Columbia Builder Leaves Maryland Buyers Fuming, BALTIMORE SUN, June 7, 2009, at
IA.
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devastating effects:
4
Foreclosures depress housing and commercial real estate prices
throughout neighborhoods, imposing serious costs on third parties.
Each of the eighty closest neighbors of a foreclosed property can
suffer a nearly $5,000 property value decline as a result of a single
foreclosure. Communities with high foreclosure rates suffer
increased urban blight and crime rates. When families have to
relocate, community ties are cut, affecting friendships, religious
congregations, schooling, transportation[,] and medical care.
Numerous foreclosures flood the market with excess inventory that
depress other sale prices. Thus, foreclosures can harm other
homeowners both by encouraging additional foreclosures and by
reducing home sale prices, while decreased property values hurt
local businesses and reduce state and local tax revenues.
With so many residential developers entering bankruptcy, the
question of whether the U.S. bankruptcy and debtor/creditor regime has
shaped the current situation for the worse is urgent. Looking for
answers to address this issue, a review of the bankruptcy literature
revealed a gap: there is little past empirical work focusing specifically
on bankruptcies occurring during a severe downturn. This is also true in
relation to studies on bankruptcies in the residential development
industry.
In response, this Article offers a systematic empirical inquiry into
the bankruptcies of 222 residential developers and home builders which
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the current housing crisis. Only
4.6% of the developers that filed for Chapter 11 in this study had a
confirmed plan of reorganization by the end of the sample period. Such
results are consistent with anecdotal observations. The majority of these
cases were dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 and as a result, the real
estate was either foreclosed upon by the secured lenders or liquidated in
forced sales.
This study also revealed that secured lender control of bankruptcy
proceedings was a major driver of these outcomes. This conclusion was
supported by observations from the bankruptcy dockets, which showed
that an overwhelming proportion of the motions filed by secured lenders
4. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A
SOLUTION: MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 2 (Mar. 6, 2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf.
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to obtain relief from the automatic stay, known as 'lift-stay motions,'
prevailed, allowing the secured lenders to pursue foreclosures. 72.5% of
the cases showed at least one instance where a secured lender sought a
lift-stay motion to pursue foreclosure; 92.2% of these motions were
successful.
The rise of secured creditor control in bankruptcy proceedings and
their preference for liquidations and asset sales has been much discussed
in the literature, and there is disagreement as to whether it is desirable.5
Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen argue that higher secured creditor
control leads to more efficiency in resolving the fate of distressed
companies. 6  According to their view, companies fail because their
resources have not been efficiently managed and reorganizations may
delay better utilization of such resources elsewhere in the market.7
On the other hand, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Westbrook, Lynn
LoPucki, and others argue that creditor control may result in the
destruction of viable firms and opine that Chapter 11 has a variety of
important roles to play in terms of societal utility through maximizing
the going concern value of a bankrupt firm.8 This Article's contribution
to this debate, through an analysis of developer bankruptcies, lies in
providing perspectives as to how secured creditor control, as embodied
by the single-minded pursuit of foreclosure and liquidation, does not
5. See generally Barry Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 219, 235 (2004); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751-52 (2002); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors'
Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917,
918 (2003); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Party in
Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2003);.
6. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1231-32 (2006);
James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 139, 162-64 (2004).
8. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2007); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A
Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645,
653 (2003); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 5, at 12-13; Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 826 (2004); Harvey R.
Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 170-72
(2005); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78
AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 198-99 (2004) [hereinafter Miller & Waisman, Reorganization].
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necessarily lead to an optimal utilization of assets during this economic
downturn.
Baird and Rasmussen have argued that "businesses in Chapter 11
have little going-concern value and sales are usually the best way to
preserve whatever value exists." 9  Some may also argue, as did the
counsel for the senior secured creditors in the bankruptcy of large
residential developer LandSource Communities Development
("LandSource") that secured lenders need to act quickly to preserve the
value of the assets through swift liquidations when asset prices or values
are falling. Counsel for Barclays Bank, Bruce R. Zirinsky, articulated
this view:
[T]his is a wasting asset. This is a depreciating asset. Values are
declining. This is not about controlling the case; this is about
providing lenders who are willing to accommodate a debtor and the
other financial constituents a reasonable time to come up with a plan,
a consensual plan. At the same time, we have to be very cognizant
about protecting interests of the lenders whose assets are at risk here
.... We have-and it doesn't take an expert. One just has to read
the newspapers every day. We have assets that are declining in
value. They have declined dramatically in value since the time the
loan was made, and they are continuing to decline in value. 10
However, in this specific set of cases in the highly-distressed
residential development industry, liquidations are not necessarily the
most optimal outcome during a severe economic downturn. Under
downturn conditions, prices are unlikely to reflect the true economic
value of the assets-for instance, new rules enacted by the Financial
Standards Accounting Board during the downturn in 2009 allow
institutions to not use mark-to-market accounting for certain long-lived
assets." In the LandSource case, the judge responded to this line of
reasoning as follows:
(Bankruptcy Judge, Hon. Kevin J. Carey): Here it's a real estate case
... [a]nd I understand the atmosphere in which your client is now
9. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's
Ghost, 1999 S. CT. REv. 393, 402-06 (1999).
10. June 25, 2008 Hearing Transcript at 17, In re LandSource Communities Dev.,
LLC, No. 08-11111 (Bankr. D. Del. June 8, 2008).
11. Kara Scannell, FASB Eases Mark-to-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009,
at Cl.
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trying to survive, but you know, in my experience eventually the
value comes back. The question is how fast, and how much, and
what are the liquidity needs in the meantime. 12
Next, we shift gears from analyzing bankruptcy dockets to focus on
the key actor of these bankruptcy proceedings-the secured lender
which, according to this data on residential developers, is typically a
commercial bank. The central picture that emerges is that banks are
highly-constrained profit-maximizing entities. The banking regulatory
environment is a significant constraint in the current context. It is
unclear if optimal solutions are produced by a bankruptcy regime which
allows a high degree of secured lender control at a time when many
banks are fighting for their own survival. It is easy to see how banks
might forgo restructuring of the debts for long-term gain, and instead
liquidate the assets as soon as possible in a bid to raise more capital.
This Article ties together the threads of this discussion through an
empirical analysis of the banks in our data sample and their state of
financial distress. Using a series of probit regression models, we show
that a bank's financial distress has a statistically significant effect on the
probability that it will file a lift-stay motion, after controlling for firm
size, capital structure, housing market prices and region.
This Article is organized as follows: Section II describes the meth-
odology for the empirical data analysis, covering topics such as data
sources, sample selection, and the descriptive statistics of the sample.
Section III documents our findings regarding the distribution of
outcomes in the data sample. Section IV presents observations from an
in-depth investigation of the bankruptcy dockets, analyzing the actions
of secured lenders in moving debtors towards liquidation. Section V
completes the discussion with insights regarding the capital adequacy
issues of banks and other regulatory issues which help explain their
preference for liquidation.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Data on Residential Development Bankruptcies
This study revolves around the cases of residential developers and
home builders across the United States which filed Chapter 11 bank-
12. June 10, 2008 Hearing Transcript at 20, In re LandSource Communities Dev.,
LLC, No. 08-11111 (Bankr. D. Del. June 8, 2008).
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ruptcy petitions between November 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008.13
The target group is defined as companies which, at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, were involved in the development and building of
new single-family homes, condominium developments, developed lots
and raw land. The target group excludes contractors and custom
builders working exclusively on existing homes. The defining
characteristic is that target companies own and develop residential real
estate, the collateral underlying the acquisition, development and
construction loans. This can be verified through a perusal of the
Schedules of Assets and Liabilities ("Schedules") and the Statements of
Financial Affairs filed in Chapter 11 proceedings.
The first step involves identifying residential developers and home
builders which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in United States
bankruptcy courts across all districts during the specified time period,
using a collection of sources such as The Troubled Company Reporter,
Bankruptcy Datasource, government agency databases, publications
from industry associations such as the National Association of Home
Builders, press releases from the news archives, reports on developer
bankruptcies, and searches of Bloomberg data. Then, data is collected
on these cases from bankruptcy dockets on the PACER (Public Access
to Court Electronic Records) system. From PACER, court records
comprising the bankruptcy petition, the Schedules, the Statements of
Financial Affairs, relevant motions filed by debtors and creditors, orders
entered by the court, the disclosure statement, and the plan of
reorganization are extracted. For each case, the data extraction and
coding is verified by hand.
Chapter 7 bankruptcies are beyond this Article's scope and are not
included in this sample. The key reason why Chapter 7 bankruptcies do
not fall within the ambit of this research is that bankruptcy relief under
this Chapter expressly provides for liquidation, whereas this research is
primarily concerned with why residential developers, with an
opportunity to reorganize in bankruptcy, are going into liquidation. The
exclusion of this segment of cases does not affect the findings in this
13. The recession technically began in December 2007. See NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC
ACTIVIrY 1 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf However,
we found in our archival searches that the flurry of residential development defaults
started in November 2007, so we set the sample selection period to start on November
1, 2007.
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Article for two main reasons.
First, in assessing the procedural and economic outcomes of these
bankruptcy cases (discussed further in Sections 3 and 4 of this Article),
we have benchmarked the cases against prior literature dealing only with
Chapter 11. Second, being cognizant of the possibility that Chapter 7
cases can be converted to Chapter 11, especially those commenced by an
involuntary petition, a random sampling of fifty cases of Chapter 7
developer bankruptcies was undertaken to test whether this is material to
the research in terms of affecting the liquidation or reorganization rate.
Of these 50 cases, there was only one case where the debtor moved to
convert proceedings to Chapter 11. In less than two months, however, a
motion was filed to convert the case back to Chapter 7 and the case was
dismissed prior to the hearing of this conversion motion.' 4 There were
five cases involving involuntary Chapter 7 petitions but these were not
converted to Chapter 11.
Next, where there are cases of several companies belonging to a
single holding company, these are considered as separate cases, unless
the court allowed substantive consolidation, under which the related
companies could pool assets and liabilities. 5 While joint administration
is very common for corporate groups, courts have considered sub-
stantive consolidation an extraordinary measure.' 6 We believe that,
absent substantive consolidation (in such cases, the lead case designated
in bankruptcy is tracked in the data collection process), subsidiaries and
affiliates in a corporate group should be considered separate legal
entities for data reporting purposes.
B. Research Design
The first part of this research is designed to rigorously study the
resolution outcomes of Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and verify
the phenomena observed in the residential development industry during
this economic downturn. The second thread of this examination is the
type and extent of secured lender control in these developer
bankruptcies.
Since this Article is primarily concerned with the Chapter 11
14. See generally Docket Report, In re Kyle James Wheatley, No. 08-61092
(Bankr. W. D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2000).
15. Where substantive consolidation is recorded for a set of cases, only the lead
case (designated by the bankruptcy court) is analyzed for the purposes of this Article.
16. See, e.g., In re Gandy, 229 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002).
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process, the procedural outcomes captured are categorized as follows:
* Confirmation of a reorganization plan;
* Confirmation of a liquidation plan;
* Sale of substantially all assets free and clear of liens under
Section 363;
* Conversion to Chapter 7; and
* Dismissal of bankruptcy proceedings.
The economic outcomes are categorized as follows:
* Continuation of the business with a new capital structure
(reorganization);
* Shutdown of the business (foreclosure or liquidation); and
* Going-concern sale.
A limitation of this study is that a number of cases in the sample are
currently unresolved in terms of the outcomes listed above.' 7 In trying
to be as timely as possible in documenting and analyzing fairly
unfamiliar phenomena with important consequences relating to the
housing crisis, the implication is that since the cases are filed in 2007-
2008, a number of them will still be unresolved. A balance must be
struck, however, between the importance of analyzing a recent
phenomenon at the core of the current recession, and the need for
"methodological purity" in terms of using cases which meet a strict
definition of resolution.
The reasoning for this is twofold. First, a key objective of this
study is to examine secured lender control and their actions in moving a
bankruptcy case in one way or another. In the volatile environment of
the sample period, with declining real property values, secured lenders
acted quickly to safeguard their collateral. This study documents the
kind of actions taken in that respect. Furthermore, the limitation on
exclusivity periods introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") facilitates a much faster
resolution.
Second, Warren and Westbrook showed in their empirical study of
Chapter 11 business cases that "substantial screening" occurs early in
17. The cut-off date adopted for assessing case resolution in this sample is July 31,
2009.
626 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
the case. 18 Of all the cases that were eventually pushed out of Chapter
11 without a plan being filed, more than half were gone in less than six
months, 70% were gone by nine months, and more than 80% were gone
within a year.' 9 One can argue, however, that weak cases are pushed out
earlier in proceedings and that cases culminating in plan confirmations
will take longer.
Warren and Westbrook found that the median time to resolution in
their sample was 264 to 274 days, while the median time to plan
confirmation was close to one year. 20 On the other hand, a study of
1,096 public companies filing for Chapter 11 between 1979 and 1990
found the median time to resolution by economic outcomes to be as
follows: 1.1 years (merged/acquired); 1.2 years (liquidated); 1.4 years
(emerged as a public company); and 1.3 years (emerged as a private
company).2
Thus, to avoid sampling bias, the sample includes cases which are
"substantially resolved," as compared to the above categorization of
procedural outcomes for cases which are "strictly resolved."
"Substantial resolution" includes major milestones towards resolution
such as the filing of a Chapter 11 plan, the filing of a motion for a
section 363 sale of substantially all assets, and successful lift-stay
motions.
The metric for plan filing is inspired by Warren and Westbrook's
empirical study.22 It is thought to be a useful indicator for sorting cases
which are "Dead-on-Arrivals" ("DOAs") from those which are plausible
candidates for reorganization. The filing of a section 363 sale motion is
a corollary for plausible candidates for bankruptcy sale. On the other
hand, lift-stay motions pursuant to foreclosure and their ensuing orders
are important in the residential development context. Cases where the
core real estate has been foreclosed upon are likely to result in
conversion or dismissal, even if proceedings subsequent to the order
might be moving along slowly.
As such, six categories of "substantial resolution" outcomes are
differentiated as follows:
18. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 630-32 (2009).
19. id.
20. Id.
21. EDWARD I. ALTMAN, BANKRUPTCY, CREDIT RISK, AND HIGH YIELD JUNK
BONDS 492 (2002).
22. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18, at 614-15.
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1. The Court has ordered relief from stay for substantially all
assets for the secured lenders(s) to pursue foreclosure;
2. The Court has ordered relief from stay for certain assets for
the secured lenders(s) to pursue foreclosure;
3. The Debtor has filed a plan and no lift-stay motions have
been filed by secured lenders yet;
4. The Debtor has filed a plan and at least one lift-stay motion
has been filed by a secured lender;
5. The Debtor has filed a plan and the court has entered at
least one order for relief from stay for a secured lender to
pursue foreclosure; and
6. A motion for a sale of substantially all assets under section
363 has been filed, pending hearing.
Based on the above sample selection and research design, 235
Chapter 11 developer bankruptcy cases were identified. Thirteen cases
which were filed too close to the data cut-off date to reach a major
milestone were eliminated.23
The other set of information tracked under the bankruptcy docket
analysis are the types of actions taken by secured lenders. These include
significant motions and court rulings during Chapter 11 proceedings
such as the following:
24
* Lift-stay motions to pursue foreclosure;
* Dismissal of the case;
* Appointment of a trustee;
* Termination of exclusivity or the filing of a competing plan;
and
* Conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.
The literature suggests that in every instance where the Bankruptcy
Code provides the Chapter 11 debtor with substantial power, it checks
23. Note that, of these thirteen cases, six of them were filed in December 2008.
24. See generally Tom Chang & Antoinette Schoar, The Effect of Judicial Bias in
Chapter 11 Reorganizations (Sept. 11, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.rsm.nl/portal/page/portal/ERlM/Content_Area/Documents/5. In this
empirical study, the authors consider the most important creditor-filed motions in the
Chapter 11 process to be the motions for case dismissal, conversion to Chapter 7, relief
from stay, and objection to the reorganization plan. We have considered all of these,
apart from the last motion type which is typically filed in almost every instance where a
reorganization plan is filed.
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that power with avenues for creditor action. 25 The primary elements of a
debtor's power include initiation of the procedure and the trigger of an
automatic stay and exclusivity (the exclusive right to file a plan during
the first 120 days). The correlative creditors' powers thus include
conversion, dismissal, relief from stay, the termination of exclusivity,
and the appointment of a trustee.
C. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The final sample consists of 153 "strictly resolved" cases, 58
"substantially resolved" cases, and 11 "mega" cases. Figure 1, below,
describes the distribution of cases in the sample by total assets and total
liabilities at the time of the bankruptcy filing, excluding the "mega"
cases.
26
Figure 1
Distribution of Total Assets and Total Liabilities
Share $500K
of Sample or less $1M $5M $I0M $25M $50M $100M $100M+ Median Mean
Tot. Assets 2% 4% 26% 19% 27% 11% 6% 3% $7.44M $18.32M
Tot. Liab. 1% 4% 30% 19% 26% 11% 7% 2% $8.86M $19.80M
These "mega" cases, where total assets exceed $250 million, are
separately analyzed to avoid sampling issues. These were designated as
complex cases in bankruptcy proceedings, owing to the multiple
subsidiaries and affiliates. Based on the methodology outlined in
subsection A, each entity is treated as a separate case as long as no
substantive consolidation has been ordered yet. Since these cases take
longer to resolve and their resolution outcomes may be similar across
the same corporate group, these "mega" cases are segregated from the
rest of the sample for analysis to avoid any distortion of the overall
results..
Based on the descriptive statistics, the data points in the sample are
25. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11,
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405,418 (2007).
26. While the Schedules require debtors to report the "current value," i.e., market
value, most debtors either use book value or the value from the last appraisal. There are
also a few missing values where the debtor entered "TBD" in the Schedules.
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reasonably well-distributed across the board, in terms of size.27 Figure 2
presents the geographical distribution of 211 cases by the state of the
bankruptcy filing; it shows a reasonable distribution across states, with
natural concentrations in states worst hit by the housing crisis. As for
the "mega" cases, three are filed in Delaware, four in California, two in
Florida, and two in Illinois.
Figure 2
Geographical Distribution of Cases
Distribution of Cases by State
State Count State Count
Alabama 2 Minnesota 2
Arizona 31 Mississippi 3
Arkansas 2 Missouri 2
California 16 Nevada 7
Colorado 6 New York 3
District of Columbia 1 North Carolina 27
Florida 23 Ohio 2
Georgia 13 Oregon 4
Idaho 2 Pennsylvania 1
Illinois 1 South Carolina 4
Indiana 1 Tennessee 5
Iowa I Texas 14
Kansas 1 Utah 4
Maryland 18 Virginia 5
Massachusetts 2 Washington 2
Michigan 5 Wisconsin I
Looking at the geographical distribution, the large number of cases
in relation to North Carolina is partly due to sixteen residential
development entities, each managed by Landcraft Management LLC,
but which are not substantively consolidated, and have different
resolution outcomes.
27. There are relatively less companies with total assets or total liabilities under $5
million. This is expected--even small residential developer bankruptcies are generally
bigger than small business bankruptcies due to the substantial real estate holdings.
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Second, the number of cases in relation to California may seem a
tad low, given that the Californian housing market is considered to be
one of the worst-hit in the country. Part of this is due to the large
proportion of bankrupt residential developments in California that are
represented in four mega cases-LandSource, Dunmore Homes, the
SunCal companies, and Empire Land. For example, at the time of
bankruptcy, Dunmore Homes alone had 26 communities in California,
and the SunCal companies constituted one of the largest private
residential developers in California, with more than 250,000 residential
lots and ten million square feet of real estate valued at $300 to $600
million in bankruptcy proceedings.28
Another reason is that large companies have a disproportionately
huge market share in California. To illustrate, the ten largest residential
developers and builders in the United States (including non-defaulted
companies) occupied 52.3% of the Southern California market and
56.4% of the Central California market in 2007, compared to 28.8% of
the North Carolina region.29
Nevada and Florida are also states with badly-hit housing markets
where the proportion of cases in our sample may look relatively low.
Besides the fact that two of the mega cases are in Florida, it should be
noted that in 2007, the ten largest residential developers and builders in
the United States occupied 72.1% of the Miami/Miami Beach/Kendall
area and 63.2% of the Cape Coral/Fort Myers area.30 As for Nevada, we
omitted from the sample bankrupt residential developers in Las Vegas
which were also hotel and resort developers. 3'
To reiterate, we believe that these figures show that the data points
in the sample are reasonably well-distributed across the board.
28. In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., No. 07-13533, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.
14, 2008), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/opinions/mg/162320_210_opinion.pdf. See
Disclosure Statement filed by Lehman Brothers at 17-22, In re Palmdale Hills Prop.,
LLC, No. 08-17206 (lead case) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008).
29. FITCH RATINGS, US HoMEBUILDING/CONSTRUCTION: TiE CHALK LINE-
QUARTERLY UPDATE: SPRING 2009.
30. Id.
31. For example, one case omitted is Lake at Las Vegas Joint Venture, LLC-the
developer of a 3,592 acre resort destination which also comprises of two luxury hotels
(including a Ritz-Carlton), a casino, and golf courses. See Voluntary Petition of Debtor
at 4, In re Lake at Las Vegas Joint Venture, LLC, No. 08-17814 (Bankr. D. Nev. July
17, 2008).
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HI. CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY OUTCOMES OF RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPERS
The key results of our data collection exercise are summarized in
the table below, showing the distribution of outcomes from the sample
(excluding the 11 "mega" cases). Figure 3 lays out the distribution for
the main dataset, where the cases have been resolved using a strict
definition of resolution, as well as the augmented dataset containing
cases that we consider to be substantively resolved.
Figure 3
Distribution of Procedural Outcomes in the Dataset
Procedural Resolution of Cases
Sub- % of
Strict Resolution Total Subtotal
Converted to Chapter 7 34 22.2%
Dismissal 85 55.6%
Section 363 Sale 17 11.1%
Plan Confirmed 17 153 11.1%
Substantive Resolution
Order for relief from stay for substantially all 26 44.8%
assets
Order for relief from stay for certain assets 9 15.5%
Plan filed by debtor and at least 1 order for relief 6 10.3%
from stay
Plan filed by debtor and at least 1 lift-stay 4 6.9%
motion
Plan filed by debtor; no lift-stay motions 9 15.5%
Sale motion filed and pending hearing 4 58 6.9%
Total 211
The quick overview presented by Figure 3 provides two main
insights. First, Chapter 11 cases in the residential development industry
in this time period are least likely to be resolved through a confirmed
plan and are more frequently dismissed or converted to Chapter 7
bankruptcy. Moreover, upon examining the cases with plan confir-
mation, only seven of these plans involve reorganization. Therefore, the
actual reorganization rate is only 4.6% of the overall sample. Second, of
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the cases which are substantively resolved, the majority of them have
experienced relief from stay pursuant to foreclosure, with 44.8% having
almost no assets left to support viable prospects of reorganization.
These key findings will be discussed in detail throughout this Section.
A. General Findings
The most striking point of the empirical findings is that an
overwhelming majority of the Chapter 11 cases ended in dismissals and
conversions. Furthermore, plan confirmation rates stood at a low level
of 11.1%. This distribution is based on the 153 cases (excluding 11
"mega" cases) where there has been "strict resolution", i.e., plan
confirmation, consummation of a section 363 sale, conversion to
Chapter 7, and dismissal.
There is a stark contrast between this distribution of bankruptcy
outcomes and those calculated from LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research
Database ("BRD")-see Figure 4 for a benchmarking analysis of these
findings against those based on the full data sample from the BRD for
1980 through 2008 and a sub-sample for a prior downturn of 2001
through 2002.32
Figure 4
Comparison of Bankruptcies in the Residential Development
Industry (2007-08) with Large Public Bankruptcies
Plan
Data Sample Dismissal Conversion 363 Sale
Confirmation
153 Residential Developers 55.6% 22.2% 11.1% 11.1%
and Builders (2007-08)
733 Large Public
Companies from BRD 0.8% 4.1% 10.0% 85.1%
(1980-2007)*
176 Large Public
Companies from BRD 1.7% 2.8% 19.3% 76.1%
(2001-02)*
*Source: Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database
32. There was insufficient data to come up with the distributions for prior
downturns such as 1980-81 (8 observations) and 1990-91 (70 observations).
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It is unsurprising that the rate of plan confirmation in this data
sample would be lower than that in the BRD, or that the dismissal and
conversion rates would be higher, since the former consists of smaller
companies in a particularly distressed industry (as opposed to a wide
range of large public companies). The disparity in rates is extremely
wide, however.
Drilling into the rate of dismissals and conversions, there is less
attention in prior studies to the proportion of dismissal rates in
bankruptcy proceedings, except for the following papers which provided
indicative levels for these procedural outcomes (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
Empirical Findings on Dismissal and
Conversion Rates from Prior Literature
Literature Findings on Dismissals Data Sample
and Conversions
153 cases, consisting of
large corporate cases
listed in the Bankruptcy
Ayotte and Morrison Conversion rate: 14% Datasource "Public and
(2008)33 Dismissal rate: 9% Major Company
Database" during the
latter half of 2001, with
median assets of $151M.
Northern District ofNorthern District of
Illinois cases (1998-99):Illinois cases: 23.2%
470 cases (median assets
conversion rate and 43.6%
Morrison (2006 dismissal rate; of $114,160);
(Al disis rAll districts (from SurveyAll districts:
of Small Business
39.4% conversion rate and
29.9% dismissal rate Finae (m8-9)
____________________13,457 cases (median
33. Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11 30 (Columbia L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 321, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1081661.
34. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of
Continuing Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies 51 (Columbia L. & Econ. Working
Paper No. 239, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=880101.
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assets of $320,971)
Bernant and Flynn Conversion rate: 35.4% 131,089 cases filedbetween 1989 and 1995
(1998) Dismissal rate: 35.3% ieen disritin different districts
Compared to the ranges in prior studies, the conversion rate in this
data sample is comparable but the dismissal rate at 55.6% seems very
high. On the other hand, the combined conversion and dismissal rates in
this data sample of 77.7% seems comparable to those in the Morrison
(2006) and Bernant and Flynn (1998) studies. Note, however, that these
two studies include small business bankruptcies. The ensuing impli-
cation is that bankrupt residential developers in this downturn are being
dismissed and converted at similar rates to small business bankruptcies.
This is disturbing because these developers are much larger companies,
(median assets of $7.44 million, liabilities of $8.86 million), with
substantial real estate holdings. 36
Warren and Westbrook's study found relatively high dismissal
rates, over 60%, suggesting that weaker cases were culled early in
bankruptcy proceedings.37 In that study, of all the cases eventually
pushed out of Chapter 11 without a filed plan, more than half were gone
by six months, 70% by nine months, and more than 80% within one
year.38 Examining our sample, these developer bankruptcies, although
considerably larger in size, were pushed out faster: 67% were gone by
six months, 90% by nine months, and more than 95% within one year.39
As for plan confirmation rates, the 11.1% in our study is low
compared to the findings in other studies. A 1997 report by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission cited a report by the Administrative
35. See Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Outcomes of
Chapter 11 Cases: US. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions, 2 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 8 (1998).
36. See Douglas G. Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11
Cases: An Empirical Study 32 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-866865 (finding that most small business bankruptcies "never
confirm a plan of reorganization but they are converted or dismissed... .
37. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18, at 630-3 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. Note that Warren and Westbrook's sample had a median total debt load of
about $643,490 (1994 sub-sample) and $1.8 million (2002 sub-sample), compared to
our sample with a median total debt load of $8.9 million.
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Office of the U.S. Courts that found a 17% confirmation rate.40 In more
recent empirical studies, the confirmation rate hovered between 30% and
75% (see Figure 6).
Figure 6
Empirical Findings on Plan Confirmation Rates
from Prior Literature
Literature Findings on Plan Data Sample
Confirmation
1994: 30.3% 1994: 437 cases;2002: 197 cases
Warren & confirmation rate;
Westbrook 4  2002: 33.4% (Smaller cases, with only 2.62% (1994)
and 25.19% (2002) over $5 million in
confirmation rate 42total assets). 4
153 cases, consisting of large corporate
cases listed in the Bankruptcy
Aotte 2001: 75% Datasource "Public and Major
Morrison
(2008)43 confirmation rate Company Database" during the latter
half of 2001, with median assets of
$151M.
Northern District of Northern District of Illinois cases: 470
Illinois cases (1998- cases;Morrison
(2006)44 99): 33.2% All districts: 13,457 cases;
confirmation rate; Mainly small cases with 81.1% under $1
All districts (1998-99): million in total assets.
40. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW COMMISSION ch. 2, nn.781-82 (Oct. 20, 1997), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/09amass.html.
41. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18, at 632-33. Warren and Westbrook also
discussed a screening effect, finding that the confirmation rate for cases that survived
six months was much higher-41% in 1994 and 47% in 2002. To check how this
"screening effect" affected the findings in this paper, we checked the confirmation rate
for cases surviving six months. The result budged slightly upwards, showing a 12.5%
confirmation rate.
42. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 568 (1999); Warren & Westbrook,
supra note 18, at 641.
43. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 33, at 26.
44. Morrison, supra note 34, at 51.
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30.7% confirmation
rate
2393 Chapter 11 cases filed between
1990 and 1996 (around 340 cases aAncel &
Markell 1990-96: 39% year), in Region 10 of the United States(1999)45 confirmation rate Trustee's Office, including Indiana and
the Southern and Central Districts of
Illinois.
LoPucki 48 public company cases over twelve(1983)46 47% confirmation rate months in the Western District of
Missouri, 1979-80.
This study seeks to look beyond the procedural outcomes of these
developer bankruptcy cases to the economic outcomes, as discussed in
the research methodology. The more important part of the inquiry is the
extent to which liquidations of the bankrupt developers are observed.
This is addressed in the following Sections where we dig deeper into
bankruptcy dockets to investigate the actual resolution in these cases.
B. Do Dismissals and Conversions Necessarily Mean Liquidations?
This Section presents findings that the cases resolved through
dismissals and conversions to Chapter 7 were essentially liquidated and
ceased to operate as going concerns, in terms of economic outcomes.
While the economic outcomes revolving around dismissals can be fairly
ambiguous, such that we have to investigate the reasons for dismissal,
the economic outcomes in Chapter 7 conversion cases are fairly clear-
cut. This is because the mainstay of Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings
involves a trustee taking over and conducting a piecemeal liquidation of
the assets for distribution to creditors.
There is a hybrid form of conversion cases in which a going
concern sale under section 363 is first undertaken, followed by a
45. Steven H. Ancel & Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland: Chapter 11
Dispositions in Indiana and Southern Illinois, 50 S.C. L. REV. 343, 349 (1999).
46. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 272-73 (1983).
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conversion to Chapter 7.47 Since such cases would be considered sales,
rather than liquidation, a review of the sample is necessary to identify
whether any of the Chapter 7 conversions were preceded by section 363
sales.
All of the conversion cases in this study were preceded by at least
one order granting a secured lender relief from stay to pursue
foreclosure, except for eight cases. The latter were converted to Chapter
7 by the U.S. Trustee, citing reasons such as the debtors' failure to
proceed with reorganization in timely fashion, an absence of reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation, and debtors' failure to file reports or pay
fees. None of these involved section 363 sales.
Moving on to case dismissals, prior studies have stated that
dismissals can sometimes follow a successful accommodation between a
debtor and its creditors without the need for a court-approved Chapter
11 plan.48  A 1994 study cited anecdotal evidence from bankruptcy
lawyers and judges that a fair number of cases were dismissed because
parties have worked out a settlement that they were not able to achieve
prior to the Chapter 11 filing. 9 In contrast, Morrison's empirical study
on 103 business bankruptcies in the Northern District of Illinois showed
that 83.4% of the dismissal cases ended in the shutdown of the
business.5°
While these studies refer to older data, they show that the economic
outcomes in dismissal cases can be idiosyncratic, and there was no
systematic factual inquiry regarding the circumstances behind the
dismissal of these cases. Bearing this in mind, and conjecturing that the
data available today may be of better quality, we investigated the filings
documenting the reasons for the dismissals of these cases.
Of the 85 dismissal cases in our sample, the main reason for
dismissal was that the bankruptcy estate had minimal valuable assets
remaining available for liquidation or distribution, and that a plan was
47. Occasionally, Chapter 11 cases convert to Chapter 7 after having first
confirmed a plan of reorganization. See Richard C. Friedman, Issues in Chapter 7 Cases
Converted from Chapter 11, 12 or 13, J. NAT'L ASS'N BANKR. TRUSTEES, June 2000,
available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/articles/docs/
nabtalk072000.pdf.
48. Bermant & Flynn, supra note 35, at 8.
49. See Samuel L. Bufford, Wat Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About
Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 833 (1994).
50. Morrison, supra note 34, at 52.
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no longer feasible. Further investigation showed that about 94% of the
dismissals (81 cases) involved some form of foreclosure or liquidation
as an economic outcome. This is illustrated in the first three rows of
Figure 7.
In 55 of these cases (the first row of Figure 7) the motion for
dismissal was preceded by orders granting secured lenders relief from
stay to foreclose on substantially all real property of the developer, or
orders granting relief on certain core assets (typically accompanied by
the debtors' motions to abandon interests in the remaining assets to
creditors). Dismissal is a logical step in such cases since the expense of
Chapter 11 proceedings can no longer be justified where successful lift-
stay motions meant that there were no more assets of significant value
available for distribution to the general creditor body.
In eight of these cases (the second row of Figure 7), there were
successful lift-stay motions by some, but not all, secured lenders, and
certain assets remained with the estate. However, the debtors or the U.S.
Trustee moved to dismiss the case by citing, inter alia, that there was no
reasonable likelihood of reorganization and that Chapter 11 proceedings
would not benefit the rest of the creditors.51 Such dismissals without
restructuring of the capital structure typically exposed the firms to
potential liquidation under state law, according to Morrison's 2006 study
which showed that the probability of shutdown was very high in cases
which exited without new capital structures.52
Figure 7
Breakdown of Dismissals in the Dataset
Dismissals (from Strict Resolution) Count Subtotal % of Total
Estate has minimal
valuable Assets -
Foreclosure or dismissal preceded by 55 64.7%
Liquidation as lift-stay order on all
an economic assets
outcome
Estate has minimal 8 9.4%
valuable Assets -
51. Note that where the case was dismissed by motion filed by the U.S. Trustee, the
motion will usually include reasons such as the failure to file reports and schedules,
quarterly pay fees, and so forth.
52. Morrison, supra note 34, at 52.
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dismissal preceded by
lift-stay order on certain
assets
Reasons related to sale
or foreclosure after 18 81 21.2%
bankruptcy
Otherwise Settlement of claims
between creditor and 4 4 4.7%
debtor for continued
I operations
TOTAL 85
Of the remaining 21.2% of dismissals (18 out of 81) which did not
fall under the above category, the reasons for dismissal are summarized
as follows:
* Motions by creditors to dismiss the case (in order to pursue
state law remedies such as foreclosure) have been approved
by the court;
* Voluntary motions to dismiss by the debtors following
contentious hearings on lift-stay motions or court
determinations of Single Asset Real Estate ("SARE")
status;53 and
* Proposed sale of substantially all real property (outside of
the section 363 sale provisions) to a junior creditor which
would continue negotiations with the senior secured
lender.5
4
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2008). A SARE determination affects the deadline
date for submission of a confirmable plan or the commencement of monthly interest
payments. See, e.g., Joint Statement Regarding Chapter 11 Conference at 2, In re Valle
Grande Props. LLC, No. 08-11016 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008) (the debtor stated
in a filing some time after determination of its SARE status that it "believes that the
Court now has sufficient jurisdiction to enter an order in relief').
54. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss by Debtor at 2, In re SMG Land Dev. LLC, No.
08-40902 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2008). The proposed acquirer of the real property,
the holder of a junior lien, had entered into negotiations with Sovereign Bank;
thereafter, the debtor dismissed the case since the estate would have no remaining assets
available for distribution.
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Only four of these cases actually involved settlements of the claims
between the developers and its creditors, and in one case, a third party
entity purchased the claim of the secured lender and agreed to allow the
debtor to continue in operation.
Therefore, with 95.3% of the dismissal cases found to have
culminated in foreclosure or liquidation and 100.0% of the Chapter 7
cases being liquidation cases, the results from this empirical analysis at
this point reflect the high rate of liquidation in the residential
development industry during this time period.
C. To What Extent Were Cases with Conflrmed Plans Reorganizations?
While Chapter 7 is the prevailing method of business liquidation,
Chapter 11 expressly contemplates liquidation through a plan.5 A
liquidating plan may contemplate piecemeal liquidation not much dif-
ferent from a typical Chapter 7 proceeding, but its key distinguishing
features are that the debtor's management can control the plan process,
creditors can vote on the plan, and the plan may include deviations from
the absolute priority rule.56
In identifying the nature of the Chapter 11 plans in our sample, we
went beyond the label affixed to the plans and examined the post-
confirmation arrangement proposed by the debtor.57 For example, in the
case of Landing Development, the debtor proposed a "Reorganization
Plan" which laid out what was substantially a liquidation scheme. The
plan provided for repayment of the secured lenders by compelling a
liquidation sale of the existing residential development and restricted the
debtor to an inventory of no more than sixteen homes.58
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2008). It has been said that it is a "false
dichotomy that paints chapter 11 as the tool of reorganization with chapter 7 as the sole
means of liquidation." See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE 156 (1995).
56. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 141-43 (1990).
57. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 676 (observed that many cases coded as
"emerged" might actually be sales of some sort, ranging from a sale where the business
did not emerge intact as an independent entity to a sale of substantial level of assets
while maintaining the business as a discrete legal entity). In undertaking this study, we
took pains to guard against this issue.
58. See generally First Amended Disclosure Statement, In re Landing Dev. Inc.,
No. 08-31686 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 14, 2008). At the time of plan confirmation, the
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Of the seventeen cases where a plan was confirmed, only seven
involved reorganization plans, and the remaining were plans for liqui-
dation. A typical liquidation plan in our sample essentially affords the
developer the opportunity for an orderly sale process. To illustrate, in
the plan confirmed for Heritage Homes, the debtor would be allowed to
market its properties for a period of six months from the date of
confirmation. In the event that these properties were not sold within the
agreed-upon time frame, the estate would abandon its interests and allow
secured lenders to pursue foreclosure. If the sales were to generate net
proceeds in excess of the secured claims, the proceeds would be held in
a disbursement trust account for the benefit of unsecured creditors.59
As for the seven cases with reorganization plans, one of them, First
Dartmouth, would restructure the claims with its remaining creditors,
even though substantially all of its real property had already been
foreclosed upon.60 This appears to fall within the gray area between
reorganization and liquidation.
An interesting observation developed from those cases with a
confirmed reorganization plan is that more than half involved recently-
completed developments which have either started to generate rental
income or are potentially income-producing. 61 This is unsurprising, as
developers of income-producing real estate are likelier to make regular
payments to secured lenders and therefore provide more comfort to the
development consisted of 26 townhouses and 89 lots. Id. at 4. The plan stated that "[a]t
no time shall the standing inventory or townhome units exceed 16 (including any that
are under construction), excluding the 4 model townhome units" Id. at 6 (emphasis
added).
59. See Joint Disclosure Statement and Plan of Liquidation at 3, In re Heritage
Homes Inc., No. 08-13285 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. May 29, 2008).
60. See Schedules of First Dartmouth Homes at 2, In re First Dartmouth Homes,
No. 07-12927 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2007) (noting that the company owned two
lots of real property, both of which are collateral securing the claims of Regions Bank);
see also Disclosure Statement of First Dartmouth Homes at 6, In re First Dartmouth
Homes, No. 07-12927 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2008) (stating that "Regions Bank shall
conclude the foreclosure of the [above-referenced] two lots").
61. See, e.g., Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs at 67, In re North Park
Village LLC, No. 07-06618 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007); 7/31/2008 Transmittal of
Financial Reports and Certification of Compliance at 6, In re Northpoint Village of
Utica LLC, No. 08-53097 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 29, 2008); 2/22/2008 Motion for the
Authorization of Rental at 5, In re The Towers of Channelside LLC, No. 08-00939
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2008).
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lenders in terms of a lower probability of default on restructured claims.
It should be noted, however, that the broader socioeconomic impact of
the liquidation and foreclosure of unfinished homes is far more severe
than that of completed and income-producing properties.
D. Are the "Mega " Cases on the Track to Reorganization?
Of the eleven "mega" developer bankruptcies, five cases have been
resolved and only one case, LandSource Communities, had confirmed a
reorganization plan.62 One of the cases, Empire Land, had been con-
verted to Chapter 7, after multiple lift-stay motions in pursuit of fore-
closure by secured lenders were approved by the court.63 Kimball Hill,
Dunmore Homes, and Levitt & Sons all had confirmed liquidation plans.
In these three cases, a portion of the real estate assets were sold or
foreclosed upon by the time of confirmation. Dunmore Homes occupied
the most "extreme" end of the spectrum-at the time when the plan was
confirmed, secured lenders had already foreclosed upon substantially all
residential developments, leaving the developer's assets consisting of
land options, deferred compensation funds, receivables, deposit
accounts, and litigation claims.64
At the time of writing, four out of the eleven "mega" cases saw
debtors filing a plan: Tousa and DBSI proposed liquidating plans, while
Woodside Group and WCI Communities proposed reorganization
plans. 65  The remaining cases-the SunCal group and Neumann
62. See June 2, 2009 Disclosure Statement of Debtor at 5, In re LandSource
Communities Dev., LLC, No. 08-11111 (Bankr. D. Del. June 8, 2008).
63. See generally Docket Report, In re Empire Land, LLC, No. 08-14592 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2008).
64. See, e.g., Second Amended Disclosure Statement at 44-49, In re Levitt and
Sons, LLC, No. 07-19845 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2007) (noting that relief from stay
had been granted for certain creditors); Disclosure Statement of Debtor at 32-33, In re
Kimball Hill, Inc., No. 08-10095 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2008); Disclosure Statement
at 28-32, In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., No. 08-20569 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2007)
(listing the various assets left at the time of confirmation).
65. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Chapter 11 Plan at 57, In re TOUSA Inc.,
No. 08-10928 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008); Disclosure Statement in Support of Joint
Plan of Reorganization at 15-16, In re Woodside Group, LLC, No. 08-20682 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008); Disclosure Statement for Reorganization Plan at 1, In re WCI
Communities Inc., No. 08-11643 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2008); Disclosure Statement
of Debtor at 6, In re DBSI Inc., No. 08-12687 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 10, 2008). Note
that Woodside Group's proposed reorganization plan must be put into context-the
bankruptcy petition was filed on behalf of the 30 major banks and 5 insurance
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Homes-had not filed a plan yet, but their progress in bankruptcy
proceedings suggests that liquidation or sale would be a likely outcome.
Neumann Homes was confronted with multiple successful lift-stay
motions and, as it filed for bankruptcy on November 1, 2007, its exclu-
sivity period to file a reorganization plan, a statutory maximum of 18
months under the BAPCPA, had expired at the time of writing. 66 It
should be noted that distressed lenders (IndyMac, Guaranty Bank, and
GMAC) held more than 70% of the $115 million bank debt. Similarly,
the SunCal group had as their primary secured lenders subsidiaries of
the bankrupt Lehman Brothers, and the trustee has since condemned
their role in burdening the estate with liabilities of at least $100 million.
This raises the issue of the simultaneous distress of both developer and
secured creditor which we will discuss further in Section V.
67
E. Benchmarking Economic Outcomes against Other Studies
Based on the foregoing analyses, the actual rate of liquidation in the
"strict resolution" sample of 153 cases is 81.7%, being a composite of
the following:
* 52.9% from dismissals (81 cases with liquidation or
foreclosure as an outcome);
* 22.2% from Chapter 7 conversions (all of the 34 cases
which were converted); and
* 6.5% from confirmed plans of liquidation (10 cases).
The economic outcomes in this study are benchmarked against
those of prior empirical studies-Edith Hotchkiss and Robert
Mooradian's 2004 study on Chapter 11 cases for 1,400 public
companies from 1979 to 2002, Sreedhar Bharath's 2007 study on public
companies' Chapter 11 filings for the period of 1980 through 2005,
which showed a liquidation rate of 18.8%, and the Ayotte & Morrison
(2008) and Morrison (2006) studies (discussed above in Section 4.1).68
companies against 185 affiliated borrower/guarantor entities that had borrowed in
excess of $600 million on an unsecured basis.
66. See Disclosure Statement of Debtor at 1, In re Neumann Homes, Inc., No. 07-
20412 (Bankr. N.D. I1. Nov. 1, 2007) (noting that the plan was filed on Aug. 26, 2009).
67. See, e.g., In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, No. 08-17206 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
Nov. 6, 2008) (lead case).
68. See generally Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 33; Morrison, supra note 34;
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Figure 8 summarizes the results of this benchmarking exercise.
Figure 8
Benchmarking Economic Outcomes against Prior Studies
Literature/Data Liquidations 363 Reorganization Others*Sale
This Study (2009) 81.7% 11.1% 4.6% 2.6%
Bharath,
Panchapegesan and 18.8% 11.3% 59.3% 10.5%
Werner (2007)
Hotchkiss and 21.5% 7.6% 70.6% N/A
Mooradian (2004)
Morrison (2006) 62.1% 5.3% 24.2% 8.4%
Ayotte and Morrison N/A
(2008) 66.0% 32.0%
The liquidation rate for bankrupt developers in our study, at 81.7%,
is high compared to these studies. A possible explanation is that the
liquidation rates for the studies by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2004) and
Bharath et al (2007) relate to large companies, while our sample covers
residential developers, which are mostly middle-market. On the other
hand, even the most optimistic estimate of reorganization rates in the
"mega" cases at 45.4% (assuming the two cases with proposed reorgan-
ization plans and the two pending cases will culminate in reorgan-
izations, i.e., five out of eleven) is not near the levels in these two prior
studies. Furthermore, the 81.7% liquidation rate is still much higher
than the rate found in Morrison's 2006 study on small business
bankruptcies, not to mention the low 4.6% reorganization rate in our
main sample of 153 cases against Morrison's 24.2%.
One way to interpret these results is that these prior studies cover an
entire economic cycle, while this sample is drawn from one of the most
distressed sectors of the economy amidst a severe downturn. If this does
Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., The Changing Nature of Chapter 11 (Fisher Coll. of Bus.
Working Paper No. 2008-03-003, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1 102366;
Edith S. Hotchkiss et al., Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress (Jan.
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1086942.
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turn out to be an important explanation for the difference in our results,
then it raises a critical question: should bankruptcy policy be shaped by
data averaged across the economic cycle? After all, large changes in the
U.S. bankruptcy regime have occurred during previous severe down-
turns when, presumably, society found the existing regime, established
during more prosperous periods, to be unsatisfactory.69 It is apparent
that the causes of bankruptcy, and the socio-economic outcomes, differ
greatly depending on the economic cycle. Perhaps the remedies should
vary accordingly.
F. Focusing on Cases with a Plan Filed
A possible criticism of the above analysis is that the data should be
filtered for dead-on-arrival ("DOA") cases, those where the debtor
arrived at Chapter 11 in such a precarious state that the debtor had no
realistic chance of survival. In Warren and Westbrook's study, this is
proxied by the situation where the debtor did not file a plan throughout
the case.70 It has been asserted that any Chapter 11 case that could be
derailed before a plan could be filed was likely to be in so much trouble
that reorganization was unlikely in the first place.
Applying this logic, the data is re-analyzed after identifying the
cases where the debtor had filed a plan. The results are presented in
Figures 9 and 10. Each figure shows the distribution of outcomes in
cases where a plan was filed, compared to the proportion of outcomes in
cases where no plan was filed.
Figure 9
Procedural Outcomes
Debtor-Filed Plan No Debtor-Filed Plan
Count % Count %
Converted Ch. 7 16 24.6% 18 20.5%
Dismissal 26 40.0% 59 67.0%
69. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Law in the United States,
3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 32 (1995) (documenting that bankruptcy legislation has
often been enacted on the heels of domestic economic turmoil).
70. Specifically, cases where the debtor did not file a plan of reorganization
throughout the life of the case. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 18, at 614.
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Sale (363) 6 19.2% 111 112.5%
Plan Confirmed 17 26.2% N/A N/A
Predictably, the rate at which any reorganization plan was con-
firmed increased, to 26.2% in the sub-sample of cases where the debtor
proposed at least one plan. The plan confirmation rate remains very low
compared to Warren and Westbrook's findings in relation to cases with
a debtor-filed plan - 65.5% in 1994 and 71.6% in 2002.71 Moreover, in
terms of economic outcomes, in Figure 10 below, the level of
reorganization is still low at 10.8%.
Figure 10
Economic Outcomes
Debtor-Filed Plan No Debtor-Filed Plan
Count % Count %
Liquidation 51 78.5% 74 84.1%
Reorganization 7 10.8% N/A N/A
Going Concern Sale 6 9.2% 11 12.5%
Others 1 1.5% 3 3.4%
The use of a debtor-filed plan as a proxy for DOA incidences is
problematic because it places an excessive emphasis on the debtors'
actions. Warren and Westbrook explained their approach by likening
the bankruptcy court to an emergency room. They argued that if an
emergency room attracts a large number of DOAs, even the best-run
emergency room would score badly in a system that simply counted the
number of people who die in the emergency room.72 If the DOAs were
excluded, they reasoned, patient outcomes drawn from a pool within
their control would more accurately measure the skill of the emergency
room staff. This analogy does not work as well in the bankruptcy
context, where the actions of other stakeholders, in particular secured
lenders, are likely to affect the debtor's ability to file a plan. Under the
Warren and Westbrook analogy, this is akin to an emergency room
where actors besides the doctors and patients decide whether or not to
pursue life-saving treatments.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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As Miller and Waisman have remarked, the bankrupt debtor must,
while "in its most fragile state, either challenge the lender's liens and
security interests or seek to use the lender's cash collateral over the
lender's objection, which if they are options at all, involve lengthy and
resource-draining proceedings, or accede to the lender's demands. 73
Furthermore, as this Article discusses in the next Section, many of these
developer bankruptcies were fraught with lift-stay motions. A developer
kept busy fending off multiple lift-stay motions may not have the time
and resources to file a plan. As the Official Committee of the Unsecured
Creditors of Village Homes, a case discussed further in the next Section,
stated in a response to a lift-stay motion by the lender, "the Debtor has
been constantly forced into litigation with its secured creditors ... rather
than focused on a re-organization .... The Motion [for relief from stay]
continues this unfortunate trend."
7 4
G. Casting a Wider Net with "Substantially Resolved" Cases
Another possible criticism of this Article's findings is the potential
for sample selection issues. Since this sample is comprised of recent
cases, between November 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008, it is
conceivable that the cases which may result in plan confirmation are still
in a pending stage and that reorganization cases may take a longer time
to reach resolution.
To address this issue, we have collected docket information on
cases which are "substantially resolved" in doing so, we consider
successful lift-stay motions, the filing of a Chapter 11 plan, and the
filing of a motion for a section 363 sale of substantially all assets as
major milestones towards resolution. Figure 11 summarizes the reso-
lution status of these cases.
73. Miller & Waisman, Reorganization, supra note 8, at 185.
74. See Official Unsecured Creditor's Committee Response to Motion for Relief
from Stay at 1, In re Village Homes of Colo. Inc., No. 08-27714 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov.
6, 2008).
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Figure 11
Status of Substantially Resolved Cases
Cat. Status # %
1 Order for relief from stay for substantially all assets* 26 44.8%
2 Order for relief from stay for certain assets* 9 15.5%
3 Plan filed by debtor and at least 1 order for relief from stay 6 10.3%
4 Plan filed by debtor and at least 1 lift-stay motion 4 6.9%
5 Plan filed by debtor; no lift-stay motions 9 15.5%
6 Sale motion filed and pending hearing 4 6.9%
*Cases where no plan has been filed by the debtor yet.
The most optimistic scenario regarding the substantially resolved
cases involves an expectation that all of the cases in Categories 2-5 in
Figure 11 will result in a confirmed plan. These cases do have some
probability of reaching plan confirmation: a plan has been filed but not
yet confirmed for cases in Categories 3-5; and while an order for relief
has been granted regarding certain assets for cases in Category 2, it is
still possible for the debtor to file a plan. In this scenario, we have
excluded cases in Categories 1 and 6. While it is possible that Category
1 cases can still culminate in plan confirmation,75 these cases are more
likely to move towards dismissal or conversion, given the loss of sub-
stantially all assets.
Based on this optimistic scenario, 28 cases from Categories 2-5 can
be added to the 15 cases with a plan confirmed (in the "strictly resolved"
sample). This means that the estimated plan confirmation rate can be
increased from 11.1% to 20.4%, but it is still lower than the range in
prior empirical studies cited above.
It is easy to see that very optimistic assumptions are required before
the debtors in our sample achieve a plan confirmation rate closer to the
range in previous studies. As gleaned from the findings in subsection F,
only 26.2% of the cases where a plan was filed ended in confirmation.
Further analysis of the "strict resolution" sample also shows that cases
with a plan filed and at least one order for relief from stay (i.e., Category
3 cases) have a 17.8% chance of confirmation. Besides, we should also
75. Note that in the case of First Dartmouth, the debtor managed to confirm a
restructuring plan with the other creditors in relation to remaining assets, even though
substantially all real estate has been foreclosed upon. See supra note 60.
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consider the fact that 33.3% of the cases in Category 2 (where a plan is
not filed yet) were filed more than twelve months ago. Given the
statutory maximum on plan filing exclusivity of eighteen months and
solicitation exclusivity of twenty months, these cases face a rushed
timeframe and the probability that all of these cases would reach plan
confirmation is not that high.
Furthermore, as discussed above, it is not merely plan confirmation
which is important, but the confirmation of a reorganization plan. At
first glance, eleven of the plans filed were liquidation plans and eight
were reorganization plans. As such, even if we assume that the re-
maining cases will culminate in reorganization, the addition of these
cases to the overall sample will only bring the reorganization rate to
7.1%.
This Section shows evidence that residential developers are going
into liquidation and foreclosure at an unprecedented rate. The next
Section presents details on exactly how secured lenders are exerting
their influence to bring about such liquidation or foreclosure outcomes.
IV. THE ROAD FROM BANKRUPTCY TO FORECLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION
The foregoing analysis of this relatively comprehensive dataset has
demonstrated that the outcomes of bankruptcy cases that we have
studied are very different from those of prior studies. The main finding
is that only a small minority of developers reorganize in Chapter 11,
with the vast majority ending up in liquidation or foreclosure. This is
unsurprising because secured lenders often prefer a swift sale or
liquidation of the debtor, as opposed to a Chapter 11 reorganization
process fraught with uncertainty and delay. In fact, the gradual move
toward greater control of Chapter 11 proceedings by secured lenders has
allowed fuller expression of the lenders' incentives for swift resolution
of financial distress. 76
This appears to be the situation in the residential development
industry, at least as evidenced by the low reorganization rate tracked in
the last section. This Section sheds light on the variety of methods em-
ployed by secured lenders in moving bankrupt debtors down the path to
liquidation or foreclosure.
76. See generally Adler, supra note 5; Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and
Future ofBankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016 (2003).
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A. The Prevalence of Lift-Stay Motions
As discussed in the previous section, many of the dismissal and
conversion cases in developer bankruptcies were preceded by the
following orders:
* Orders granting secured lenders relief from stay to foreclose
on substantially all real property of the developer, or
* Orders granting relief on certain core assets followed by the
debtors' motions to abandon interests in the remaining
assets to creditors.
The high combined rate of dismissals and conversions indicates a
prevalence of lift-stay motions pursuant to foreclosure - a key finding in
relation to secured lenders' actions. Indeed, this is the main finding
borne out in bankruptcy docket analysis of secured lender actions. In
the overall sample of 211 developer bankruptcies, there are 153 cases
(72.5%) where at least one lift-stay motion in pursuit of foreclosure was
filed by a secured lender. In contrast, data gathered on such
bankruptcies between 2004 and 2006 revealed a rate closer to 50%.
While the sample size is small (i.e., data on 35 residential development
bankruptcies was collected during this time period owing to relatively
fewer defaults), a 95% confidence interval ranges from 31% to 66%,
considerably lower than the 72% level experienced in cases occurring
during the current crisis.7 7 More importantly, in 92.2% of these 153
cases, an order granting the motions was entered. 78
In relation to other actions observed, at least one secured lender
moved to dismiss proceedings in twenty cases (9.5%); moved to convert
the case to Chapter 7 in fifteen cases (7.1%); moved to appoint a trustee
in ten cases (4.7%); and moved to terminate exclusivity or file a
77. The 95% confidence interval extends from 33.0% to 64.4% (based on the
adjusted Wald method) and 31.4% to 66.0% (based on the Clopper & Pearson method).
78. Note that there is a dearth of literature regarding the proportion of lift-stay
motions and their approval in bankruptcy proceedings, but we did find one study
finding that creditors filed lift-stay motions in 68% of all shutdowns and the court
granted them 42% of the time. Morrison, supra note 34, at 54. Note that these relate to
small business bankruptcies filed in 1989-90 and the numbers are based on shutdowns
only, not the entire sample (i.e., the proportion of lift-stay motions is much lower than
the levels found in our sample).
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competing plan in three cases (1.4%). These actions are not mutually
exclusive; it is relatively common for lenders to file a motion for
dismissal and conversion, in the alternative.79
The prevalence of these successful lift-stay motions suggests an
issue meriting further investigation. After all, part of bankruptcy policy
is based on the principle that there should be a moratorium on asset
grabs. The following subsections analyze the rationale for these lift-stay
motions, the grounds asserted by secured lenders in these motions, the
extent to which the phenomenon is legislative or market-driven, and the
incentives of the insiders such as guarantors.
B. Relief under 11 U.S.C. 362
The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay under
section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.80 Part of the fundamental pro-
tections afforded to debtors, the automatic stay is meant to provide
debtors with breathing space from their creditors during which they can
attempt to structure a plan to repay their debts or arrange for relief from
the financial pressures that drove them into bankruptcy.8
There are two main grounds typically advanced in support of lift-
stay motions:
" Cause, including the lack of adequate protection (section
362(d)(1)); or
* The debtor's lack of equity in the property and that such
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization
(section 362(d)(2)).
This Article next illustrates how secured lenders use sections
362(d)(1) and 362(d)(2) in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of
residential developers. Village Homes of Colorado ("Village Homes")
represents a classic case. One of Colorado's largest residential devel-
opers with around $200 million in annual revenues, Village Homes filed
for bankruptcy on November 6, 2008. Before the recession began in
2007, Village Homes would have hardly seemed like a candidate for lift-
79. See, e.g., Docket Report at 40, In re Le Jardin, LLC, No. 08-77019 (Bankr. N.
D. Ga. Aug. 9, 2008).
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2008).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977).
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stay motions pursuant to foreclosure. Its profile appeared to be in line
with a plausible candidate for debt restructuring and reorganization, with
a reasonable chance of success.
Since its founding in 1984, Village Homes built nearly 10,000
homes in Colorado.82 It developed active communities in seven loca-
tions throughout the Denver metropolitan area, two locations in northern
Colorado (Fort Collins and Longmont), and two locations in the
Colorado mountains (Granby and New Castle). It has developed com-
munities ranging from small residential infill to large-scale, mixed-use
master plans, and offers a variety of home types and price ranges. In
fact, some of the communities developed by Village Homes had
received numerous local, state, and national awards, including
"Community of the Year" from the Home Builders Association of
Metropolitan Denver every year from 2002 through 2007.
Nonetheless, like many residential developers, Village Homes'
Chapter II filing was precipitated by the onset of severe housing market
downturn conditions as well as the credit crisis, which caused a
significant constriction of credit and reduced the funds that the
developer had available to continue normal operations. At the time of
bankruptcy, the company had 142 finished, but unsold, homes in
inventory, comprised of 11 completed homes under contract with a
buyer, 79 completed homes not under contract, and properties under
construction with projected costs of completion estimated at $5.9
million.
Four days after the bankruptcy filing, Guaranty Bank, the
administrative agent for the lender group, initiated the first volley, a
motion objecting to the use of cash collateral. A highly contentious
dispute ensued. While the secured lenders took the position that the
cash Village Homes had on hand constituted their cash collateral, the
developer argued that the lenders had limited security interests on
personal property and that part of the cash belonged to home buyers who
put down deposits. 83
In the midst of this dispute, the secured lenders also launched lift-
stay motions in pursuit of foreclosure against Village Homes.84 Note
82. See Debtor's Brief in Support of Motion for Expedited Entry of Order and
Notice of Impending Hearing Thereon at 1, In re Village Homes of Colo. Inc., No. 08-
27714 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008).
83. Id.
84. On January 21, 2009, Guaranty Bank, as agent for the Lender Group, filed its
motion for relief from stay. See generally Motion for Relief From Stay, In re Village
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that the relief was sought very early in the case, when Village Homes
was barely in Chapter 11 for two months and had had no chance to focus
on reorganization. First, under the ground of "cause" in the lift-stay
motions, the secured lenders argued that there was a "lack of adequate
protection." "Lack of adequate protection," a term of art defined only
by example in the Bankruptcy Code, is generally considered the most
common basis for finding cause to grant relief in bankruptcy
proceedings.85 Generally speaking, a secured creditor's interest is
adequately protected when provisions that the court considers adequate
has been made to protect the secured creditor from loss from a decline in
the value of the secured creditor's collateral during the imposition of the
automatic stay.
86
In particular, the lenders cited the decline of residential real estate
values and the lack of adequate protection payments as sufficient
showing that they, the secured lenders, were not protected from any
deterioration in the value of their collateral. Moreover, they argued that
the debtor had not closed any sales of houses under the terms of the
Ordinary Course Order entered by the Court and had only closed five
"short sales" by the time of the lift-stay motion. 87
Based on the cases in our sample, it is relatively rare to find cases
where the cash-strapped bankrupt developers were able to furnish
adequate protection payments in cash. Indeed Village Homes argued
that it was providing adequate protection of the secured lenders'
interests by continuing with the construction and development of its
housing projects, citing cases that post-petition improvement of real
property is sufficient to constitute adequate protection.
This argument is quite weak. On the issue of "adequate protection"
in the bankruptcy of Den-Mark Construction on April 7, 2009, the
district court rejected a similar argument, citing the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit: 
88
Homes of Colo. Inc., No. 08- 27714 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008).
85. See generally Relief from the Stay, 1-362 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL P
362.07 (3d ed. rev. 2008)
86. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 103 (5th ed. 2005).
87. In this context, short sales mean sales of real estate in which the proceeds from
the sale fall short of the balance owed on a loan secured by the property sold.
88. See In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552, 567 (3d Cir. 1994).
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[C]ontinued construction based on projections and improvements to
the property does not alone constitute adequate protection... Those
cases which have considered improvements to be adequate
protection have done so only when the improvements were made in
conjunction with the debtor's providing additional collateral beyond
the contemplated improvements . . . We reject the notion that
development property is increased in value simply because a debtor
may continue with construction which might or might not prove to
be profitable.
It should be noted that this case is premised on the policy that
"Congress did not contemplate that a secured creditor could find its
position eroded and, as compensation for the erosion, be offered an
opportunity to recoup dependent upon the success of a business with
inherently risky prospects."89 The question is whether legislators con-
tinue to adhere to this policy in the significant nationwide decline in
housing prices starting in 2007, where almost all distressed real estate
businesses can plausibly be considered to have inherently risky
prospects.
Next, the secured lenders argued that the debtor had no equity in the
property and that the property was not necessary for an effective
reorganization. They were quickly able to show that Village Homes had
no equity in the real estate. 90 In the course of the creditors' meetings,
the debtor acknowledged that the deficiency for creditors might be
higher than the $35 million shown by values reported in its Schedules of
Assets & Liabilities, owing to the depressed values of uncompleted
properties. 9 Village Homes reported in its Schedules total liabilities of
$138.4 million, of which the bulk was owed to senior secured lenders,
and total assets of $103.9 million.
The secured lenders then proceeded to assert that there was no
prospect of a successful reorganization. Citing precedents, they argued
that the mere indispensability of the property to the debtor's survival and
89. Id.
90. Note that in many cases, this issue is not as clear-cut for several other
developers and, in those instances, the litigation would center on the different appraisal
values of the real estate, including issues such as whether the "as is" or "upon
completion" values should be used. In some of these cases, if the court had assigned a
different value, the outcome might have been different.
91. This is unsurprising, given the low market value of the uncompleted properties.
n fact, it is a common phenomenon in developer bankruptcies, given the high loan-to-
value ratios in loans extended to developers, and the sharp negative correction in real
estate prices since 2007.
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the debtor's hopes of reorganization were insufficient to justify
continuation of the stay when reorganization is not reasonably
possible. 92  The central argument was that without post-petition
financing, Village Homes had no feasible way to continue its business,
and that terms for financing the developer could not be agreed upon.
Since the secured lenders were thought to have a strong legal case
during hearings, Village Homes eventually agreed to compromise and
settle with its secured lenders on March 13, 2009. 93 While not a case
which culminated in an order for relief and foreclosure, the developer
agreed to a forced sale of "Non-Core Assets," which included most of
the residential lots under construction and a portion of finished homes.
94
In the agreed stipulation, Village Homes acknowledged that it had no
equity in these "Non-Core Assets" and that they were not necessary to
an effective reorganization such that relief from stay was appropriate
under § 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The three main arguments marshaled by these secured lenders in
asking bankruptcy courts for relief from the automatic stay in order to
foreclose are:
1. The developer no longer has any equity in the collateral
because its value has plunged with the sharp decline in
residential real estate values and the developer was highly-
leveraged at origination;
2. No lender has offered to refinance the project, so
reorganization is impossible; and
3. There have been no or very few offers to purchase homes
(or the project itself) as a result of the housing market crisis.
Judging from the high proportion of cases where relief from stay
was ordered, it appears that the current bankruptcy regime and
bankruptcy judges are sympathetic to such arguments. To some extent,
this might be a carry-over from times when many bankruptcies were a
92. See, e.g., In re Coones v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 B.R. 247, 259 (D. Wyo.
1994).
93. Docket Report at 376, In re Village Homes of Colo. Inc., No. 08-27714 (Bankr.
D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008). Note that the compromise happened after the initial exclusivity
period expired. This case is also an example as to why companies which are not DOAs
may not file a plan in time, given that the resources were tied up fighting lift-stay
motions.
94. Id.
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result of poor management. Finance scholars call this idiosyncratic risk.
This reasoning is less applicable in the current environment, where the
entire residential development industry is collapsing along with housing
prices nationwide, with many large and small firms alike entering
bankruptcy. 95 These factors, coupled with illiquidity in the financing
markets, reflect systematic risk. Under these circumstances, the
argument that the aggressive liquidation preferred by senior lenders is
simply separating the wheat from the chaff falls apart. When the entire
sector, if not the entire economy, is suffering, there are unlikely to be
sales and transfers which amount to a "better" utilization of those assets.
Perhaps the bankruptcy case of Grusaf LLC, a middle-market
developer of condominiums in Florida, elucidates more clearly the
single-mindedness of many secured lenders on repossessing the property
and pursuing foreclosure at all costs. Grusaf proposed a plan providing
for the sale and marketing of the property within six months from the
entry of the confirmation order. If the sale was not consummated, the
property would be surrendered to the bank.96 Nonetheless, the secured
lender vehemently objected to the developer's proposed plan. First, the
lender characterized the plan as unfeasible, arguing that the developer
had "no reasonable prospect of being able to sell its property." The
lender also said the plan was unfair and inequitable because it did not
"propose to make any payments to the Bank during the six month period
within which the Debtor propose[d] to sell the Bank's collateral." 97
As in the Village Homes' bankruptcy, there was a lack of buyers for
the residential real estate in Grusaf's case. It is unclear what resources
the creditors were supposed to "capture" and reinvest when the assets of
the business were properties under construction. Indeed, another
bankrupt developer remarked in a court filing in relation to their
properties where the common area and certain infrastructure were still
95. In an empirical study on highly leveraged transactions of the 1980s, which
subsequently became financially distressed and filed for bankruptcy, it was found that
high leverage, not poor firm or industry performance, was the primary cause of
financial distress. Gregor Andrade & Steven Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not
Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became
Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443, 1444-45 (1998).
96. Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation at 2, In re Grusaf, LLC, No. 07-bk-
12701(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2007).
97. Id. Note that, at the time of this objection, the developer had just begun renting
out some condominium units, and the process would have taken a while before it could
make adequate protection payments to the bank.
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under construction, "[w]ithout amenities and competing with sellers in
the market who provide for infrastructure costs in sale contracts, a
liquidation of the Debtors' assets is unlikely to attract any but the most
opportunistic buyer." 98
This brings to the forefront a set of policy questions which are not
adequately addressed by the current bankruptcy regime. In a period of
severe market correction, should the legal framework allow developers
to retain and complete the properties, instead of allowing creditors to
seize the properties? Which party is in a better position to be respon-
sible for the properties, since a forced sale is likely to result in a lose-
lose situation? In fact, a motion filed by the debtor, Village Homes,
highlights this policy puzzle:
There is a fundamental inconsistency in the position RFC [the
secured lender] has taken regarding their assertion of a housing
market decline in the RFS Motion versus their position on the
Debtor's Sale Motion. RFC objected to the Debtor's proposal to sell
homes quickly and resolve disputes over the proceeds at a later time.
Apparently RFC was not worried about a declining market in that
context, but now contend that the court should grant it relief from
stay because of its fears about a declining market. Does RFC really
expect that the Short Sales it objected to will somehow turn into
higher priced sales if it is given relief from stay, and do so quickly
enough to overcome the feared market decline? If RFC really fears
that home prices are going to decline, wouldn't it be more logical to
consent to all of the sales the Debtor currently has under contract, get
them closed as quickly as possible, and then assert their interest in
the proceeds?
99
Finally, it should be noted that construction loans make up a very
large proportion of total bank lending, and unloading developers' real
estate assets en masse could have negative ramifications for the property
values of many communities and people. It would even indirectly hurt
the value of the overall portfolios of banks themselves, as they have
98. April 3, 2009 Disclosure Statement of Debtor at 9, In re 2W Homestead LP,
No. 08-12195 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2008).
99. Debtor's Objection to Relief From the Automatic Stay of RFC Construction
Funding, LLC at 4, In re Village Homes of Colo. Inc., No. 08-27714 (Bankr. D. Colo.
Nov. 6, 2008) (emphasis added). The secured lender, RFC, or Residential Funding
Corporation, is part of the GMAC group and has been financially-distressed itself
during the bankruptcy proceedings-an issue which we will discuss in Section V.
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other real-estate related assets which have to be marked to market. "
C. Consent Orders and Agreed Stipulated Relief
As illustrated by the Village Homes proceeding, the lift-stay
motions can be resolved by a stipulated relief agreed between parties; in
that case, the secured lenders and the developer agreed to a liquidation
of non-core assets. Examining the information collected from the
bankruptcy dockets, of the 141 cases where the lender obtained relief
from stay, only 68 (48.2%) of these involved consent orders or agreed
stipulations between the developer and secured lenders. This proportion
is much lower than the finding in Charles Shafer's 1990 empirical study,
which found that 87% of the lift-stay motions were settled before the
court rendered its decision.' 0 ' This metric may be a reliable indicator of
contentiousness between developers and secured lenders in bankruptcy
proceedings.
This begs the question: in cases with consent orders, why would a
developer consent to relief from stay when doing so leads to foreclosure
and, particularly in cases of smaller developers, the possible dissolution
of the firm? The most common reason cited in these consent orders or
stipulated relief is the developer's desire to avoid contested proceedings.
For instance, in the stipulation entered into by Village Homes the
developer stated their compromise benefited the estate by "avoiding the
costs of litigating the relief from stay motion, providing certainty to the
Debtor of the lots it will be entitled to build on in the future."' 1 2 In
addition, these consent orders often embody a compromise in which the
secured lender agrees to foreclose on only a limited portion of the
debtor's assets, or postpone foreclosure proceedings with "drop dead"
provisions if certain milestones are not reached within a specified time
period. In exchange, the developer typically agrees to make certain pay-
100. The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: How to Help Families Save Their Homes:
Hearing on H.R. 1106 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 1st Cong., 1st Sess.
(2009) (testimony of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist, Moody's) (stating that "[g]iven that
the total cost of foreclosure to lenders is much greater than that associated with Chapter
13 bankruptcy, there is no reason to believe that the cost of mortgage credit across all
mortgage loan products should rise").
101. Charles Shafer, Determining Whether Property Is Necessary for an Effective
Reorganization: A Proposal for the Use of Empirical Research, ANN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 79, 79-81 (1990).
102. Debtor's Motion to Approve Settlement at 10, In re Village Homes of Colo.
Inc., No. 08-27714 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008).
2010 SIMULTANEOUS DISTRESS OF RESIDENTIAL 659
DEVELOPERS AND THEIR SECURED LENDERS
ments or cede a degree of control over its operations to the lender.
The Village Homes case remains illustrative of the concessions
likely to be required of a developer in exchange for the ability to retain
some of their core assets. First, the Village Homes stipulated relief
called for the appointment of a Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO").
The developer agreed to select one of two candidates presented by the
secured lenders. Amongst other things, the CRO would control the sales
of homes and the payment of lenders and other creditors from the net
proceeds."0 3 Second, while the lenders agreed to allow Village Homes
to use its cash collateral according to an approved budget, the settlement
provided contingent adequate protection to the secured lenders in the
form of a lien on receivables from an insurance premium refund of $1.5
million and a trust fund refund of $0.4 million. Furthermore, the parties
executed mutual releases, including the release by the developer of
preference claims exceeding $10 million against the secured lenders.1 4
A genre of lift-stay consent orders involves a "negotiated truce"
between the developer and secured lenders. Under this scenario, a
developer is given a specified time period to sell its property outside
foreclosure. The case of Maryland Homes Palisades PA is illustrative.
The terms of the stipulation terminating automatic stay included the
following: 05
* The automatic stay in relation to the property would be
terminated immediately with respect to the bank's rights and
remedies under its financing agreements;
* The bank would forbear from exercising its rights to
foreclose provided the developer complied with the terms of
the consent order;
* The developer was given nearly 15 months to market and
sell the remaining finished properties, with a possibility of
obtaining a 6-month extension.
At first glance, such arrangements may seem to have provided the
developer a window of opportunity to work towards an orderly sale or
reorganization. However, where the specified sales targets are overly
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Motion for Approval of Stipulation and Consent Order at 4, In re Md. Homes
Palisades PA, LLC, No. 08-18286 (Bankr. D. Md. June 23, 2008) (filed on Jan. 20,
2008).
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ambitious given the housing crisis, the developer can easily fall into
non-compliance, allowing the lender to proceed with foreclosure. This
occurred in a number of cases.'06 Part of the consent order in the case of
Maryland Homes Palisades PA carried darker overtones, complicated by
the incentives of guarantors to be released from personal guarantees. In
one of the provisions, the secured lender agreed that the principal could
pay a fixed sum of $325,000 in full and final satisfaction of his personal
guarantee of the company's debt, regardless of the status of the sales of
homes.
A prior study suggested that the capital structure below the level of
the senior secured debt may affect the outcome of cases where the
debtor's owner-manager has personally guaranteed the firm's debt.'07 If
the firm's assets at the outset of bankruptcy are sufficient to cover
guaranteed debt to lenders, the owner-manager may favor early shut-
down to avoid personal liability, at the expense of unsecured creditors.
This is consistent with a line of literature criticizing Chapter Il 's
manager-controlled process, particularly the conflict of interest
problem. 0
8
The analysis of the bankruptcy docket data in this study found that
39.7% of the consent orders contained some form of agreement by the
secured lender to waive its deficiency claim and release insiders from
their liabilities as guarantors.
In the case of Crosswinds at Lone Star Ranch 1000, Ltd., the
secured lender agreed, inter alia, to drop a lawsuit filed in a state court
106. See, e.g., Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement at 7, In re Tucson
Copper Hills Estates LLC, No. 08-02557 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2008) (noting that if
the debtor does not sell the property in question and make the payment, the lender may
immediately foreclose). In this case, a settlement was reached between the secured
lender and the debtor but the developer did not manage to sell the property by the
deadline set in the stipulated relief and the case was dismissed with the lender
proceeding to foreclosure. January 12, 2009 Minute Entry at 1, In re Tucson Copper
Hills Estates LLC, No. 08-02557 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2008).
107. Morrison, supra note 34, at 28.
108. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate
Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009) (arguing that the fiduciary duties of
managers during bankruptcy cases are ill-defined, and conflict of interest often occur,
though this problem can extend to situations where a private trustee is appointed and
controlled by one of the secured creditors). See also Barry E. Adler, A Theory of
Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 362-63 (1997) (a critique of Chapter
1 1's manager-controlled model); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822-24 (1987).
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enforcing guarantee obligations against the principal in exchange for the
termination of the automatic stay to proceed with foreclosure, 09 There
are also cases which played out like the case of Maryland Homes
Palisades PA, discussed above, where the consent order fixed the
guarantors' obligations at a relatively low level.' 0 For example, in the
case of Namwest LLC, part of the settlement involved the cancelation of
all the outstanding debt owed by the guarantors (save for a $37,500 note
executed by the guarantors in favor of the lender) in exchange for the
conveyance of real estate with a scheduled value of $28 million, and
additional ownership interests in undeveloped land."'
It should be noted that the data may under-represent the frequency
of such arrangements, which might take the form of unfiled side
agreements. 112 While it falls to bankruptcy judges to take into account
the interests of junior creditors when scrutinizing these deals, these
findings also introduce nuances to the role of creditors as positive agents
of corporate governance.
D. BAPCPA Amendments of the
Single Asset Real Estate ("SARE ") Proviso
A question often asked in post-BAPCPA days is whether the 2005
legislative changes have made the bankruptcy regime even more biased
towards creditors. The original intention of the BAPCPA was to make it
109. In exchange for lifting the automatic stay to permit PCR to foreclose and
withdraw the plan, PCR would pay $450,000 into the bankruptcy estate, dismiss the
lawsuit enforcing guarantees and exchange mutual releases. The docket showed no
objections filed by unsecured creditors, but the rushed timeframe should be taken into
account as well-merely 10 days elapsed between the filing of the motion to court
approval. See Debtor's Motion to Approve Settlement at 6, In re Crosswinds at Lone
Star Ranch 1000, Inc., No. 08-40262 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2008).
110. See generally Motion for Approval of Consent Order, In re Maryland Homes
Palisades PA, LLC, No. 08-18286 (Bankr. D. Md. June 23, 2008).
111. See Emergency Motion to Approve Settlement at 6, In re Namwest, LLC, No.
08-13935 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2008).
112. See generally February 2, 2009 Emergency Motion to Stay Sale, In re
Bysynergy LLC, No. 08-7680 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 25, 2008). Under-the-table
arrangements between the secured lender and the developer came to light after the
parties fell out. According to the motion, a party, on behalf of the secured lender,
allegedly told the principal that he would "lose personally everything" if he did not
support their position and, in return, the latter would "receive some kind of an interest
'on the back end."' Id.
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more difficult for serial and abusive filings to stand. Significant changes
include the introduction of a statutory presumption of bad faith for
certain repeat filers and restrictions on the automatic stay for repeat
filers within 12 months. The change with the most significant impact on
developer bankruptcies, however, is the change to the SARE provision.
Under section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a secured lender
is entitled to relief from the automatic stay in a SARE case unless the
debtor has:
" Filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable
possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time; or
* Commenced making monthly payments to the secured
creditor in an amount equal to the non-default contract rate
of interest accruing under the loan documents on the value
of the creditor's interest in the real property collateral.
A debtor must perform one of these actions within 90 days of the
petition date, or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor is
subject to SARE provisions, whichever is later.
Before BAPCPA went into effect, the Bankruptcy Code defined a
SARE case as one involving "real property constituting a single property
or project... which generates substantially all of the gross income of a
debtor .... and on which no substantial business is being conducted by
a debtor other than the business of operating the real property and
activities incidental thereto." ' 13  Also, the debtor's aggregate, non-
contingent, liquidated, secured debts must be less than $4 million.
Larger real estate projects did not fall within SARE ambit.
BAPCPA eliminated the $4 million cap. With the distressed
housing market, this has resulted in an increase in the number of
developers who fell under SARE's provisions.
Prior to this BAPCPA amendment, Le Jardin, which owned a
luxury real estate project consisting of 1,100 partially developed acres
and aggregate assets and liabilities of approximately $53 million at the
end of 2006, would have fallen outside the scope of the SARE
provisions. 114 Similarly, Crosswinds at Lone Star Ranch 1000, a 944-
acre development with a February 2007 appraisal value of $162 million,
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2002).
114. See generally October 16, 2008 Order, In re Le Jardin LLC, No. 08-77019
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 2008).
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and secured claims over property of about $61 million ... was also
considered a SARE case. 116 In light of the BAPCPA changes, these
cases fell within the SARE's provisions for expedited creditor relief,
which the secured lenders obtained.
It is unreasonable to expect cases involving such huge properties
and dollar value amounts of real estate to have their time for plan filing
limited to a very short time frame. With the compressed deadline, and a
secured lender who indicated its skepticism of the developer's
reorganization prospects through the filing of the lift-stay motion, it
might be unrealistic to expect a bankrupt developer to fulfill section
362(d)(3)'s requirement that a debtor present a reorganization plan with
a reasonable chance of being confirmed. A cursory review of the cases
showed many debtors were also unable to satisfy the statute's alternative
requirements and make monthly payments as well, given slow home
sales in the distressed housing market. The monthly payments
requirement presents a natural bias against developers with unfinished
properties. Developers which are still in the process of construction are
unlikely to be holding income-producing properties which generate
revenue sufficient to make monthly payments. While income-producing
properties are more likely to be the subject of reorganizations, the glut of
foreclosed unfinished properties is more problematic from a
socioeconomic perspective than the foreclosure of income-producing
properties. The implementation of the new law tilts the field in favor of
secured creditors.
It may be that the BAPCPA amendments introduced changes to
bankruptcy law that legislators, homeowners, and homebuilders alike
may come to regret. Many of the amendments were clearly aimed at
preventing the costs and delays owing to abuses of the bankruptcy
process. However, the provisions may have been shown to be over-
inclusive in scope such that it prevents certain cases, which do deserve
bankruptcy protection, from obtaining appropriate relief.
Having discussed the impact of secured lender actions on the
bankruptcies of residential developers, the following Section analyzes
how the downturn has also created pressure on banks, and argues that
115. Debtor's First Amended Disclosure Statement for Debtor's First Amended Plan
at 10, 13, In re Crosswinds at Lone Star Ranch 1000, Inc., No. 08-40262 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. Feb. 4, 2008).
116. Id. at 16.
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banks were influenced by factors beyond the simple economics of the
bankruptcy case itself.
V. REGULATORY PRESSURE, BANK REGULATION, AND THE
PREFERENCE FOR LIQUIDATION
The foregoing Sections discuss secured lenders' preference for
foreclosures and liquidations and the significant degree of control these
lenders exercised over bankruptcy proceedings in the current legal
regime. In this Section, instead of focusing on the position of the
debtors, we shift the viewpoint to the position of the lenders, most of
which are banks. 117
Banks make up most of the secured lenders in the residential
development industry, according to FDIC statistics. As of the end of
2007, the total dollar amount of construction and development loans in
the U.S. provided by banks was more than $559 billion.' 18  The
composition of the data sample in this study is consistent with this
observation: at least one bank is involved as a senior secured lender in
92.3% of the cases. 119
Much of bankruptcy literature, in the discussion of the role and
actions of banks, proceeds on the premise of banks as rational, profit-
maximizing actors, with little reference to the actual regulatory
environment in which banks function. 12  One of the assumptions
underlying the rise of secured creditor control is that a secured creditor
choosing to exert their dominant control in bankruptcy to force
117. The discussion in this Section is partly based on interviews with more than 50
banks and risk managers, as well as the author's own experience in consulting for banks
in risk management practices.
118. See generally FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, Net Loans and
Leases: Construction and Land Development (Dec. 31, 2007), at http://www2.
fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp (select "Retrieve Predefined Reports;" then under "Standard
Report #1," select "Run Report;" then select "Net Loans and Leases" and change the
"Report Date" in each column to "12/31/2007;" then select "Update Report").
119. A small proportion of the senior secured lenders comprised of hedge funds.
The sample also shows that hedge funds and finance companies involved in
construction lending tend to take second lien positions, presumably due to the higher
rates of return offered by such tranches (without discounting for default risk).
120. See generally Charles Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A
Skeptical View, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259 (2004) (argued against the central
assumption of contractualists that parties are rational, pointing to behavioral economic
studies that show people acting in systematically irrational ways).
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liquidation of a firm will do so only because it maximizes return on that
investment and when that happens, the value of the assets will be
maximized through sale and reinvestment by third parties. However, a
nuanced understanding of the financial regulatory environment of banks
can help explain how banks are motivated to pursue liquidations by
factors extraneous to the bankruptcy case itself. This exposes
potentially troubling implications for the theoretical underpinnings of
our current bankruptcy regime. After all, it is questionable as to whether
failed or failing banks should be in a position to hold the reins of
bankruptcy proceedings.
This Section presents three main perspectives explaining how the
preference for liquidation of many banks during the downturn may arise
from factors extraneous to the bankruptcy case and the individual
characteristics and asset value of the bankrupt borrower. These
perspectives include cost of capital considerations, regulatory pressures
to reduce concentrations in commercial real estate loans, and
procyclicality issues.
A. Cost of Capital Considerations
The cost of capital, or any other risk-based allocation of cost, is an
integral component of a bank's lending decisions. Capital can be
thought of as the equity cushion regulators require a bank to maintain to
absorb large unexpected losses. 2' Such capital is above and beyond
provisions for expected losses, formally known as the Allowance for
Loan and Lease Losses, against which loan losses are charged off and
replenished constantly by more provisions from net income. To prove to
regulators that it is well-capitalized, a bank needs to show, among other
121. In risk management, there are two kinds of capital-economic and regulatory.
Regulatory capital is an accounting-based measure of the capital regulators expect a
bank to have and is used widely, and can be regarded as a minimum level. Economic
capital is a measure of a bank's cushion of solvency calculated using economic models,
and can be thought of as the capital required to reach a certain standard of solvency.
Regulators are also very interested in economic capital levels. In calculating economic
capital, a bank would measure probabilities of default, the loss on the loan if it does
default, the size of its exposure at default, and an estimate of how likely its loans are to
default at the same time, or how correlated its exposures are to one another. See
generally FDIC, ECONOMIC CAPITAL AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY
(2004), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin04/
economicscapital.html.
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things, how its capital allocation to each sector of its portfolio compares
to that sector's potential for large losses.
Capital requirements are higher than simply the sum of average
losses across all loans because of what finance academics call systematic
risk. Lack of diversification on the part of the bank poses a layer of risk,
invisible to the individual debtors, yet potentially having a large impact
on how the bank will treat a distressed debtor. Essentially, regulators
want banks to be well-diversified so as to not be in danger of collapsing
due to losses in any one part of its portfolio, which can be driven by
correlated, or systematic, events that manifest as higher-than-expected
losses in that sub-portfolio. A well-diversified bank will see increasing
losses in some parts of its portfolio generally offset by decreasing losses
in another parts. 
122
Undiversified portfolios, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to
sudden shocks. To be considered well-capitalized, a bank has to
maintain a level of capital at over 10% of risk-weighted assets for
unexpected losses.'23 Regulators have assessed that if a bank is diver-
sified in its exposures, the probability of capital exhaustion falls even
further. The implication is that if a bank is not diversified, or exces-
sively concentrated, the chance of capital-exhausting events grows
unacceptably large. A bank must then either raise capital or reduce
concentrations. Since raising capital is very expensive, and even more
so in 2007 to 2008, any method of capital relief will be appealing,
including the liquidation of assets.
If a bank has a large concentration in real estate, it needs to keep a
disproportionately large amount of capital to cover sudden spikes in
real-estate losses. For example, if real-estate loans represented 30% of a
bank's loan book, and every other sector was relatively small in
comparison, a bank would need to carry more than 3% capital against
real estate loans. This is because each other sector's gains and losses
can be generally expected to offset each other, but they are unlikely to
offset in sum extreme losses on real estate loans if that sector went
south, because it is so large. The 10% number is essentially an average
across the whole book, so higher-than-average sub-portfolio risks
(balanced by the lower-than-average ones) attract higher than 10%
122. See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Foundations of Porfolio Theory, 46 J. FIN.
469 (1991).
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2003). See also FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY,
BASICS FOR BANK DIRECTORS 30 (5th ed. 2010), available at http://www.kansascityfed
.org/Publicat/BasicsforBankDirectors/BasicsforBankDirectors.pdf.
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capital. If a bank is especially concentrated, regulators might order it to
carry more than 10% capital.
Exactly how disproportionate a share of capital the real estate book
has to attract due to concentration risk is an exercise that consumes large
resources at banks and depends very much on the result of financial
analysis and portfolio modeling. In general, a bank's estimate of how
correlated the defaults of its debtors are by category is a primary driver
of rising capital. This is a particularly important issue during a down-
turn where there is often a clustering of real estate-related defaults. 
124
The disproportionate (at least, disproportionate relative to the book
value of debt, and not to risk) allocation of capital to real estate loans
means that a disproportionate share of the cost of capital has to be
allocated to real estate. This causes the bank's internal cost, per dollar
amount of real estate loans, to go up. This increased internal cost has
nothing to do with a change in the debtor's ability to cover his debts, or
an "entrepreneur's mismanagement" of his company, and more to do
with the bank's internal portfolio management efforts.
The cost of capital and provisions is thus part of the overall cost-
benefit analysis that a bank performs when making business decisions,
including making loans. For banks, it is no longer enough to speak of
Return on Assets, because this ignores risk. Instead, they use Risk-
Adjusted Return on Capital, which incorporates the cost of capital,
concentration risk, and other kinds of portfolio-wide risk.12 As an
illustration of how cost of capital affects the decision-making process of
banks, we have included in Appendix I an example provided by a
regional bank showing a wide disparity in loan spreads depending on the
capital ratio levels.
Next, in order to meet the shareholder-mandated return on risk-
weighted assets and justify the risk-adjusted revenue relative to the risk-
adjusted cost, banks must find a way to extract more value out of their
debtors, particularly those that consume relatively more capital, which
are, in this example, real estate loans. They can do this by either
increasing fees and interest rates in the short term (and thereby
increasing default risk in the midterm) or reducing what they perceive to
be causes of default risk in the short term by imposing ever more
124. See, e.g., Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: An
Empirical Investigation ofa Subprime Lender, 28 J. BANKING FIN. 753, 754-55 (2004).
125. See CHARLES SMITHSON, CREDIT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 262-65 (2003).
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covenants and conditions on their debtors. The fastest solution to reduce
concentrations in a portfolio, of course, is to liquidate the debt entirely.
The best solution would be to sell the debt.
However attractive the notion of selling the debt to another
financial institution, this option may not be possible during a liquidity
crunch. In a downturn, liquidity will be scarce and prices low. The next
best option for the bank dealing with concentration risk in its portfolio
would be to end the relationship with the debtor somehow. The with-
drawal of financing can contribute to liquidity problems of residential
developers and, in some cases, precipitate loan defaults, and thus
facilitate foreclosure or liquidation in bankruptcy. 12 6 This would relieve
the bank of its exposure to the debtor, even if it takes a short-term loss
on its principal, because of the "invisible" cost of capital.
As the definition of capital is very close to the definition of equity,
its cost would be close to the cost of equity for a bank. Being able to
cheaply raise extra capital in a downturn, when the cost of equity will be
very high, is very desirable. If a bank were to relieve itself of a chunk of
its capital requirement by getting rid of real estate loans, it would be
another chunk of capital it would not have to pay through the nose for in
the capital markets. The cost-of-capital explanation helps shed light on
why banks may choose liquidation over reorganization. It is a flawed
assumption that a bank makes its decision to support liquidation purely
because the economic value of the bankrupt debtor is higher in
liquidation than in reorganization, essentially confusing the difference
between the market price of the assets and its economic utility to a
specific party.
A bank, when liquidating a bankrupt firm, will not only receive the
market price of the liquidated asset but also save the cost of raising
capital equivalent to that asset's price. Under normal conditions, this
price is usually negligible as the credit risk of banks as counterparties
themselves is negligible. In a credit crunch, however, this price
becomes extraordinarily high. 
27
The savings on this "capital injection" through liquidating debtors'
assets instead of borrowing money may be higher than the discounted
present value of the marginal increase in the value of the debtor in
126. Disclosure Statement at 5-6, In re Denmark Constr. Inc., No. 08-02764 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2008).
127. Erik Holm, For Buffett, Goldman Deal Looks like a Pot of Gold, WASH. POST,
July 26, 2009, at G4.
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reorganization over liquidation. Yet, this capital cost is entirely
dependent on the health of the bank. A very healthy and well-
capitalized bank with a low cost of capital would have less pressure to
liquidate its distressed debtors in search of liquidity. Another way of
looking at it is that banks are analyzing the return on assets for these
transactions, conditional on their own survival. This issue is essentially
encapsulated in the following quote from a paper on bank real estate
lending and the New England capital crunch in the 1980s.
128
Banks below minimum capital standards had only two options:
increase equity with retained earnings or new capital, or shrink their
assets. New England banks with large loan losses had little
possibility of quickly restoring capital with retained earnings and did
not raise additional equity ... they can shrink their loan portfolios by
tightening credit standards and, in some cases, calling or refusing to
roll over loans. Because poorly capitalized banks feel more pressure
to shrink their asset portfolios, their customers may find their loan
conditions or loan availability altered, primarily because of the
financial condition of their banks.
B. Regulator Pressure to Reduce Concentration Risk
Pressure to exit the real estate lending market comes not only from
a bank's own perceived need to raise capital but also regulatory action
from outside the bank, which depends on the regulator's perception of
the bank's capital adequacy. Regulatory pressure, however, is a larger
issue and begins even before capital reaches inadequate levels. There is
evidence, from the official correspondence and Congressional testimony
as well as findings from our interviews, that right before and during the
current downturn, regulators encouraged banks to reduce their exposure
to real estate-linked loans, especially construction loans. 129 From our
empirical observations, this pressure exceeded what one would expect
128. To illustrate, Goldman Sachs, in September 2008, right after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, sold $5 billion of preferred stock to Warren Buffett yielding a 10%
dividend per year, a rate more typically found in junk securities during the boom. See,
e.g., Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England
Capital Crunch, J. AM. REAL EST. & URBAN ECON. ASS'N 33 (1994).
129. The author of this article, at the 2008 Risk Management Association Annual
Conference in Baltimore, where regulators were present, observed that many sessions
were peppered with comments from regulators and bankers regarding concentration risk
in relation to commercial real estate lending, including construction lending.
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from normal supervision and created a high amount of pressure on banks
to exit exposures to the residential development market, in any way
possible.
This creates a high likelihood that banks, to avoid receiving
regulatory sanctions, responded to the pressure by reducing commercial
real estate concentrations through such solutions as liquidating debtors
(i.e., getting them off the bank's books), instead of reorganizing debtors
(i.e., keeping them on the books). Whether or not the end-result was
counter-productive to the regulators' objectives is beyond this Article's
scope, but the fact remains that banking industry regulatory action is a
factor that cannot ignored in the analytical framework of bankruptcy
scholars.
Congressional comment about regulatory interference is a reliable
indication that regulators are being active. Before the official start of the
recession, Congressman Spencer Bachus, addressing the House
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit on
regulatory guidance on commercial real estate, 130 remarked that the way
the committee sought to address high and increasing concentrations of
commercial real estate loans at some banks was "too much of a 'one size
fits all' formulation and effectively a cap on commercial real estate
lending."' 1
31
In a recent Capitol Hill testimony hearing, Michael Menzies, the
Chairman of the Independent Community Bankers of America, testified
130. See FDIC, Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
Management Practices, 71 Fed. Reg. 74,580 (Dec. 12, 2006). This was subsequently
updated in 2008. FDIC, Managing Commercial Real Estate Concentrations in a
Challenging Environment, FDIC Financial Institution Letter FIL-22-2008 (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financialU2008/filO8022.pdf. Note the
supervisory limits on the Loan-To-Value ratios in construction lending in these FDIC
Financial Institution Letters. An institution may "lend up to 65 percent of the value for
raw land, 75 percent for land development or finished lots, 80 percent for multifamily
residential construction, and 85 percent for 1- to 4-family residential construction...
the institution should ensure that the borrower maintains appropriate levels of hard
equity throughout the term of the loan." FDIC, Frequently Asked Questions on
Residential Tract Development Lending 3 (Sept. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil9OO5a.pdf.
131. A Review of Regulatory Proposals on Basel Capital and Commercial Real
Estate: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 7 (2006) (opening statement
of Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL), Chairperson, H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit).
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in Congress that "field examiners are overzealous and unduly
overreaching and are, in some cases, second guessing bankers and
professional independent appraisers and demanding overly aggressive
write-downs and reclassifications of viable commercial real estate loans
and other assets." 1
32
He also cited reports from various community bankers about
examiners requiring write-downs or classification of performing loans
based on the value of collateral irrespective of the income or cash flow
of the borrowers, placing loans on non-accrual even though the borrower
was current on payments, and downgrading of solid loans simply
because they are located in a state with a high mortgage foreclosure
rate. 133 He ended his speech with a plea that "examiners should take a
longer-term view of real estate held by banks as collateral and should
not demand aggressive write-downs and reclassifications of loans based
on forced sales of real estate that occur during illiquid or dysfunctional
markets." 13
4
When Sheila Bair, the Chair of FDIC, says that she wanted to "send
a message that regulators were concerned about growing CRE
concentrations" and that banks should "manage concentrations
according to an acceptable level of risk tolerance," banks listen.'35 After
all, FDIC has the authority to close banks that it deems to be risky and
under-capitalized and did so regularly throughout 2008 and 2009.136 In
line with this regulatory focus on reducing concentration risk, the Office
of Comptroller of Currency, which supervises a separate segment of
commercial banks, reported in a survey of credit underwriting standards
that 49% of its bank respondents reported tightening standards in
commercial construction loan portfolios in 2008, as compared to 13% in
2007.137
132. Exploring the Balance between Increased Credit Availability and Prudent
Lending Standards: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 11 1st Cong.
49-51 (2009) (testimony of Michael Menzies, Chairperson, Independent Community
Bankers of America).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Sheila C. Bair, FDIC Chairman, Remarks to the Independent Community
Bankers Association, Orlando, Florida (Mar. 5, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spmarO508.html).
136. FDIC, Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
137. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT
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Subsequently, in August 2008, Senator Ron Wyden wrote a letter to
Sheila Bair, citing that "the recent FDIC directive to member institutions
to reassess the valuations of collateral underlying outstanding
commercial homebuilding debt may actually be forcing financially
stable borrowers into default." '138 He decried the practice, which he
claimed to be driven by regulatory pressure, where borrowers, whose
newly-assessed construction loans failed to meet certain loan-to-
valuation ratios ("LTV"), were forced to pay the financial institutions an
amount necessary to bring the loans into compliance with the original
LTV ratios.139 Many borrowers are unable to meet these new financial
requirements owing to the severe recession and may be forced into
insolvency.
Approximately 1,020 comment letters were sent in response to the
regulatory guidance on "Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate
Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices," of which the majority
were protests by community banks that the prescribed capital limitations
would lead to a significant reduction in commercial real estate lending,
especially construction lending. 14  The guidance remained, however,
and the evidence thus far suggests that banks may choose to exit the
construction loan market under regulatory pressure, and one of the
swiftest ways includes liquidating bankrupt companies (regardless of
firm viability) so as to present a "cleaner"-looking balance sheet. This
upsets a major line of reasoning underlying giving banks dominant
control over the bankruptcy process, since the economics and concerns
underlying their decisions in a bankruptcy are not purely predicated on
the merits of the case.
UNDERWRITING PRACTICES 2008 4 (2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
cusurvey/2008UnderwritingSurvey.pdf. See also FED. RES. BD., THE JULY 2008 SENIOR
LOAN OFFICER OPINION SURVEY ON BANK LENDING PRACTICES 3 (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200808/fullreport.pdf (citing
similar findings).
138. See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, to Sheila Bair, FDIC Chairman
(Aug. 27, 2008) (on file with Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law)
(addressing the potential consequences certain FDIC policies were poised to inflict
upon Oregon's home building industry and small financial institutions and requesting
consideration of alternative approaches that may lessen these impacts).
139. Id.
140. FDIC, FDIC Federal Register Citations, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
laws/federal/2006/06comcrelending.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
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C. Procyclicalit in Bank Behavior
Existing bankruptcy literature appears to neglect the different
implications of bankruptcy policy, particularly on the issue of secured
creditor control, in different parts of the economic cycle. This is a
glaring omission, especially given how lenders' incentives and behavior
tend to differ in a downturn and under stress as opposed to a more
"normal" part of the economic cycle, when they are closer to the
hypothetical rational long-term profit maximizing entity found in
bankruptcy literature.
In general, banks are highly procyclical. 141 During good times,
banks incur more risks than they reasonably should through, for
example, excessive lending with poor standards. In bad times, banks
make drastic corrections and pull back their lending, which incidentally
exacerbates the wider downturn when all the banks do so simul-
taneously. 142 Quite independently of the merits of the bankruptcy case,
and somewhat independently of whether a bank is highly distressed and
in need of capital or under regulatory pressure as well, banks will in
general tighten lending standards during a recession and loosen lending
standards in an expansion. The following two charts illustrate this
phenomenon. 143
Figure 12
Changes in Underwriting Standards in
Commercial Construction Loan Portfolios (Percent of Responses)
Eased Unchanged Tightened
2003 2 61 37
2004 10 75 15
2005 29 63 8
2006 32 56 12
141. Miguel Fernndez Ord6fiez, Governor, Bank of Spain, Speech at the
Conference on Procyclicality and the Role of Financial Regulation: Procyclicality in the
Banking Activity (May 4, 2009).
142. Id.
143. See generally Michael B. Gordy & Bradley Howells, Procyclicality in Basel II:
Can We Treat the Disease without Killing the Patient? (May 12, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04gordy howells.pdf.
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2007 28 59 13
2008 8 43 49
Source: 2008 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices by the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency.
Figure 13
Proportion of Banks Tightening Standards for
Commercial Real Estate Loans
Not Percentage of DIne c Reqwonre Ta 1gfle $%tanw for ComerW Real Eftte Lo
Source: Federal Reserve, April 2009 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices
A 2003 study focusing on a behavioral view of lending practices
found evidence for a "memory hypothesis" under which the ability to
differentiate accurately between high-risk and low-risk debtors
deteriorate over time as loan officers forget the lessons of the last
recession with large credit losses. When the bank again experiences
large losses, standards tighten drastically, and the cycle begins again. 144
The implication is that banks have an implicit "risk premium" that varies
through the cycle. Their price of risk (or for risk) determines whether
they think long term or short term (through differential discount rates for
144. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Institutional Memory Hypothesis and
the Procyclicality of Bank Lending Behavior 15 (Bank of Int'l Settlement Working
Paper No. 125, 2003), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/workl25.pdf.
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future cash flows), and this drives whether they choose to support
liquidation or reorganization.
This is encouraged by banking regulation, which is generally
procyclical in nature. It pressures banks to respond to increasing
systemic risk by becoming far more conservative, on both expected
losses as well as unexpected losses. Procyclicality has been one of the
most controversial issues during the discussion of Basel H regulatory
proposals.'45 Basel II, in its original conception, represents a more risk-
sensitive capital framework whereby, as credit conditions change,
minimum requirements change correspondingly.
Specifically, under the Basel II Advanced Internal Ratings-Based
approach, capital requirements constitute an increasing function of the
primary credit risk drivers (namely, probability of default, loss given
default, and exposure at default). During the downturn, these risk
drivers deteriorate, leading to greater capital requirements. The
converse is true during upswings; banks keep less capital during good
times. It has been argued in finance literature that another material
source of financial procyclicality is the inappropriate responses by
financial market participants to changes in risk over time. 146
For example, Zions Bank stated in a 2006 letter to bank regulators
stating that Basel II capital requirements "will be updated continuously
as new default, exposure, and loss given default data are incorporated
into the quantitative analysis. In times of low losses, the capital required
by Basel II banks will drift lower .... [I]n good times large banks will
operate at an increasing competitive advantage in various types of
lending compared to community and regional banks, and will squeeze
them out of the market or into lower quality credits."
47
A key item on the Basel II agenda among regulators now is how to
145. See, e.g., Claudio Borio et al., Procyclicality of the Financial System and
Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options 1 (Bank of Int'l Settlement Working
Paper No. 1, 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap01 a.pdf; William
R. White, Procyclicality in the Financial System: Do We Need a New Macrofinancial
Stabilisation Framework? (Bank of Int'l Settlements Working Paper No. 193, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891765.
146. Claudio Borio et al., supra note 145, at 1.
147. Letter from Doyle L. Arnold, Chairman, Zions Bancorporation, to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors; Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary,
FDIC; Office of Comptroller of Currency; and Office of Thrift Supervision (Jan. 18,
2006) [hereinafter Arnold Letter], available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal!2005/05c37basella.pdf.
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regulate capital in a counter-cyclical way, and force banks not to under-
price credit during times of economic expansion. 148 Unfortunately, the
eventual result of under-pricing credit is the urge to overprice it
afterwards when a chain of defaults starts to occur. This implies that the
outcomes of bankruptcy cases can depend on the economic cycle.
As large numbers of distressed banks, seeking liquidity, foreclose
on homeowners and force properties onto the market, increasing supply
and depressing prices, the net result is actually that the marked-to-
market value of many bank assets will fall correspondingly149 -a
precursor to bank failure (which was limited by the 2009 changes to
accounting rules to allow banks to not have to mark-to-market their
assets). In a way, this posits a social dilemma, in which individuals
acting independently in their own self-interests cause a problem that
cannot be self-corrected by action of a market, because the damage is
shared mainly among those which act later.
A possible solution, to be explored by further research, is
government action that can incorporate the positive externality of
slowing foreclosures and liquidations through legal reforms, although it
is possible that privately, banks might come together to negotiate a
cooperative solution, but this is not likely as they will suffer from free-
rider problems and are also unwilling to reveal too much information on
their individual situations to their competitors.
The above perspectives provide a more complete picture of banking
behavior than contemporary bankruptcy literature, which often assumes
that the returns and costs of the secured lender come primarily from the
terms of a credit transaction and that changes in those terms primarily
stem from changes in the debtor profile and financial position.
148. Regulators and the Cycle, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?storyid=11325492. The article also has
some observations on the relationship between regulators and banks: "'What you have
to do every so often,' says a former regulator, 'is pick a performance measure of some
kind, line the banks up and shoot the dog. The rest will quickly cower at the other end
of the row."' Id.
149. Note that FDIC data shows that, as of December 31, 2008, commercial banks
have an average of 44% concentration in real estate loans. See generally FDIC, FDIC
Quarterly Banking Profile (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/
qbp/2008dec/qbp.pdf.
2010 SIMULTANEOUS DISTRESS OF RESIDENTIAL 677
DEVELOPERS AND THEIR SECURED LENDERS
D. Financially-Distressed Banks in the Data Sample
The threads discussed so far in this Section come together in the
analysis of the banks that are secured lenders to the residential
developers analyzed for this Article. If the secured lenders in this data
sample are in financial distress then they would suffer acutely from a
high cost of capital. They would also be under severe regulatory scru-
tiny and pressure to reduce their risk concentrations in real estate, and as
a result, they would pull back their financial support for the developers,
whether ordered to do so by the regulator or not. All of this would
translate into the liquidation preference observed in this Article.
This Article analyzed the actual proportion of banks in the data
sample which were in financial distress while they participated in the
bankruptcy proceedings of their debtors. In measuring financial distress
of a bank in this Article, the following metrics were used:
* Has the bank failed and been seized by FDIC or another
regulator?
" Has the bank failed, even though FDIC has not been
appointed its receiver? Examples include Wachovia (FDIC-
arranged rescue) and Lehman Brothers (Chapter 11
bankruptcy).
* Has the bank received at least one cease-and-desist order
from a banking regulator for operating with an inadequate
level of capital for its risk profile? 0
" Has the bank been under-capitalized according to Prompt
Corrective Action ("PCA") directives?
Under the PCA directives, a bank is under-capitalized when its total
risk-based capital ratio is less than 8%, its Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio
is less than 4%, or its Tier 1 leverage ratio is less than 4%. A bank is
significantly under-capitalized when its total risk-based capital ratio is
less than 6%, its Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is less than 3%, or its Tier
150. Note that empirical studies on bank capital and commercial real estate lending
have found that, although poorly capitalized banks shrank their assets more than better
capitalized institutions, the reduction was more dramatic if regulators imposed formal
actions. See generally Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Bank Regulatory Agreements in
New England, 15 FED. RES. BANK BOSTON NEW ENG. ECON. REv. 24 (1995); Joe Peek
et al., The Impact of Greater Bank Disclosure Amidst a Banking Crisis (Fed. Res. Bank
of Boston Working Paper Series no. 99-1, 1999), available at http://ideas.repec.org/s/
fip/fedbwp.html.
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1 leverage ratio is less than 3%. 151
Based on these metrics, 45.4% of the banks in the sample fell
within these categories of financial distress between November 2007
and December 2008.152
Figure 14
Proportion of Financially-Distressed Banks in the Data Sam le
Financial Distress No. %
Failed Banks 58 26.1%
Banks with Cease-and-Desist Orders 31 14.0%
Under-Capitalized Banks 7 3.2%
Significantly Under-Capitalized Banks 5 2.3%
It is problematic that almost half of the banks participating and
exercising secured creditor control in developer bankruptcies were in
financial distress themselves. More disturbingly, these results may have
under-estimated the proportion of financially-distressed banks. The
FDIC maintains a "Problem Bank" list which comprised 252 banks by
the fourth quarter of 2008.153 In addition, these results may not have
captured financially-distressed banks which have been raising capital,
including those participating in the U.S. Treasury Department's
Troubled Asset Relief Program. 5 4 As such, a failure to analyze the
environment in which banks function is a glaring omission.
Investigating this point further, this Article undertakes a quick
analysis of the effect of a bank's financial distress on the probability of
the filing of a lift-stay motion pursuant to foreclosure using a probit
151. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2003).
152. Note that, in categorizing the banks into categories of financial distress, a bank
which failed or received a cease-and-desist order, though under-capitalized as well, is
only counted once in the former categories.
153. David Ellis, Problem Banks List Top 300, CNN MONEY NEWS, May 27, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/27/news/companies/fdic-profilce/index.htm?postversion
=2009052711. Note that regulators never disclose the names on the list out of fear that
depositors at those institutions may prompt a "run on the bank." Id.
154. FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile 3 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2009mar/qbp.pdf (stating that most of the aggregate increase
in capital came from participation in TARP).
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regression model.155 The dependent variable equals one when a lift-stay
motion was filed by a bank in the bankruptcy case and equals zero when
no lift-stay motions were filed in the case. Appendix II presents the
variants of the model specifications and results.
Column (1) displays a simple model in which the filing of a lift-stay
motion is a function of the "Bank Distress" variable (a dummy variable
equal to one where a bank is financially distressed, as defined above,
and zero for others) and the size of the developer, as measured by the
total assets. Column (2) controls for price levels in the housing market
through the use of Housing Price Index released by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight in the month that the developer filed the
bankruptcy petition. Columns (3) and (4) expand this model to include
variables reflecting the capital structure of the developer-the leverage
ratio and the ratio of secured debt to total liabilities. Column (5)
introduces dummy variables based on the geographic region-Pacific,
Mountain, Midwest, Northeast, Southeast, South and Mid-Atlantic (the
base category). Finally, Column (6) presents the "kitchen sink" model
where all variables are tested in the regression.
Regardless of the specification, the primary result is the same: the
"Bank Distress" variable is statistically significant at the 1% confidence
level. Calculating the marginal effects, we find that this varies between
24.9% and 28.6%, i.e., there is a percentage change of 24.9% to 28.6%
in the probability of a lift-stay motion being filed by a bank associated
with a discrete change in that variable. This effect is economically large
and statistically significant, even after controlling for firm size, capital
structure, housing market prices, and region.
This provides strong support for the hypothesis that the financial
distress of banks is correlated with their liquidation preference in
debtors' bankruptcy proceedings. These findings ought to trouble those
who argue in favor of stronger secured creditor control. It demonstrates
that during times of stress secured lenders may just be as desperate as
their debtors and driven to understate the long-term economic value of
the bankrupt estate to raise cash quickly. In such a scenario, they ought
not to be given the driver's seat in bankruptcy.
Two examples illustrate the possible negative impact of secured
155. In undertaking the multivariate regression, only the cases where there is at least
one bank involved are used; the result is 190 observations are used in each specification
(after excluding cases with missing independent variables).
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lender control over distressed residential development properties where
the lender is itself in financial distress. The first example involves the
SunCal companies, where the bankruptcy trustee, upon undertaking due
diligence of the real estate, condemned the role of Lehman Brothers
affiliates in their role as secured lenders: 
156
Lehman's funding practices, dictatorial control over the Projects'
operations, and breach of its funding obligations created a common
layer of unpaid unsecured debt that now burdens all of the Debtors'
estates in the estimated amount of $100 million. Furthermore,
human lives and property are being put at risk from situations as
diverse as: (a) potential levee failures, (b) airborne friable asbestos,
(c) failure to provide dust and erosion control measures, (d) possible
brush fires in densely populated areas during peak periods of the
California fire season due to the failure to fund brush control, and (e)
failure to provide adequate storm water control. In addition, the
condition and value of the assets are wasting; fines have been
assessed or threatened to be assessed due to the Projects' violation of
governmental permits; entitlements are at risk; availability of
resources such as water are at risk; governmental bonds are being
called; and taxes and insurance are going unpaid. 1
57
The second example relates to the demolition of mostly-finished
single-family homes and completed model homes in Victorville,
California, after foreclosure. Guaranty Bank, the secured lender, sub-
sequently failed in August 2009. City officials stated that Guaranty
Bank had told them it would cost $100,000 to tear these down, but a lot
more to finish the project, on top of which there would be escalating city
fines should vandals and squatters take over the homes. 5 8 While one
may argue that these represent extreme examples, they highlight the
importance of placing boundaries and restraints on secured lender
control in certain circumstances to avoid situations which essentially
result in a destruction of value.
156. In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, No. 08-17206 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 6,
2008) (lead case).
157. There are other news reports about local authorities, across the country, facing
a rise in complaints about environmental and safety hazards from construction sites
where work has been frozen. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Deserted Building Sites Add to
Property Bust's Toll, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A4.
158. Michael Corkery, No Sale: Bank Wrecks New Houses, WALL ST. J., May 5,
2009, at A3. Note the fact that squatters could have been living in the homes in this
case suggest that some of these homes were probably close to completion.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We are in the midst of a major foreclosure crisis, extending beyond
residential mortgage defaults to the bankruptcies of residential
developers. The foreclosures or fire sales of new homes and unfinished
residential developments not only have a domino effect on housing
prices, but also affect home owners in a myriad other ways.
This Article takes the first few steps to bridging the chasm between
an understanding of the regulatory context in which banks function and
the bankruptcy regime by analyzing the banks' regulatory environment
and their sensitivity to the economic cycle and the cost of capital. Banks
can be viewed as highly-constrained profit-maximizing entities, and
their actions can be significantly driven by factors apart from the
individual risk profiles of debtors. Furthermore, when banks are
struggling for their own survival, issues involving liquidity, capital and
regulatory pressure may contribute to them preferring liquidation over
reorganization.
These issues are especially relevant in today's environment, where
the government provides financial support to banks through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program. It is sometimes argued that a capital
infusion into either banks or their debtor firms should make both sectors
better off. However, a cash infusion can increase the bargaining power
of the sector receiving aid with regards to the other. Douglas Diamond
and Raghuram Rajan have argued that an infusion into banks large
enough to prevent bank runs, but not large enough to extend the risk-
taking horizon, may simply lead to debtors coming under more pressure
than before by their banks.159 This is because banks are usually
recapitalized only up to the point where they still have to struggle with
profitability, whereas if distressed banks were closed and their loans
sold to healthy institutions, these new creditors are more able to take a
long-term view of the case. Diamond and Rajan, in conjunction with
this Article's conclusion, make a powerful argument for greater
oversight of how banks taking government money treat their financially
distressed debtors.
159. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, 55 J.
FIN. 2431, 2456-57 (2000).
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Finally, let us hope that the current economic crisis comes to an end
soon, but not without bringing about changes which can help mitigate
the severity and duration of future next crises are implemented.
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APPENDIX I
Example: How Cost of Capital Affects Bank Lending
This example is derived from a 2007 letter from Zions Bank to
banking regulators: 
1 60
As a simple illustration of the powerful market effects of the Basel
proposals, we provide a simple loan pricing example. Suppose that
five banks, all with 5% or higher total bank leverage ratios, allocate
five different capital ratio levels to a conventional commercial loan
.... For all banks, we assume that the required return on capital is
12%, the marginal tax rate is 40%, and the average expense rate for
originating and servicing loans is 1.0%. We have adopted these
simple assumptions to spotlight the effects of differing capital
allocations on required loan spreads. There is a wide disparity in
loan spreads over cost of funds required to provide a 12% return on
capital from a low of 1.50% to a high of 2.60%. Such differences
would logically provide significant competitive advantages for the
banks at the low end of the capital range.
Loan PricdgExample:
Cost of
Capiw: 12%
Tax
roe: 40%
Expense
rmte: 1.00%
ratio: , Requred Breakeven Spredl:
2.5% 1.50%
4.0% 1.80%
5.0% 2.00%
6.0% 2.20%
_0 2.6%
'Prc Spread which covers Cost of Capital
160. Arnold Letter, supra note 147.
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APPENDIX II
Probit Regression Model: Effect of Bank Distress on
Probability ofLift-Stay Motion Filing
11) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.4886 8.1513 8.1478 7.7928 7.3472 6.791
(0.0001) ° " (0.0322)*" (0,0323)" (0.0424)" (0.066)' (0.093)"
0.8012 0.8708 0.872 0.8566 0.7789 0.7507
(0.0007)r' " (O.003)*" (M09003)'" (0.0004)"" (a002)4" (0.0032)'"
-0.00699 0.00619 -0.00617 -0.0123 -000635 -0.0159
((.0311)" (0.0567)" (0.0594)' (0083)" (0.063)' (0.0317)"
-0.0369 -0.0368 0.0352 -0.0344 -0.0321
(0.0438)" (0.0442)*" (0.0561)* (0.0739)* (0.0995)*
-0.00462
(0.9353)
9.72E09
(0.3338)
0.0279
(0.6815)
1.48E-08
(0.2285)
0.0644 0.0942
(0.8763) (0.8212)
0,3798 0,3452
(0.2754) (0.3314)
0.2218 0.2233
(0.6317) (0.6296)
1.1068 1.1577
(0.0128) *** (00101)***
0.1762 0.2109
(0,7717) (0.729)
0.2563 0.2987
(0.4249) (0.357)
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Constant
Bank Distress
Total Assets
(millions)
Housing Price Index
Leverage Ratio
Secured Debt/Total
tiabilites
Region = Pacific
Region = Mountain
Region z Midwest
Region = South
Region = Northeast
Region = Southeast
